H.R. 1354 — Justice for All Act of 2025

This section establishes the short title of the Act as the “Justice for All Act of 2025.”

This section provides findings that the Supreme Court’s decision in Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001), impaired private enforcement of the nondiscrimination protections in title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, the Age Discrimination Act of 1975, and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. 794). It states that these “covered civil rights provisions” were intended to prohibit discrimination in federally funded programs and activities on the basis of race, color, national origin, sex, age, and disability, and that effective enforcement depends on private lawsuits as well as administrative action. It further finds that private plaintiffs must be able to challenge practices with a disparate impact that are not justified by legitimate program goals, and that Congress is acting to reinstate or confirm a private right of action to enforce those protections across covered entities, including in education, housing, health, environmental protection, transportation, and other federally assisted programs.

This section revises Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (20 U.S.C. 1681) to establish that discrimination based on disparate impact is prohibited only when a person aggrieved by sex discrimination shows that a covered education program or activity has a policy or practice that causes a disparate impact on the basis of sex and the covered entity fails to show that the challenged policy or practice is related to and necessary to achieve the program’s nondiscriminatory goals, or when the person shows that a less discriminatory alternative exists and the covered entity refuses to adopt it. It requires the person aggrieved to challenge each specific policy or practice separately, unless the person shows that the elements of the decisionmaking process are not capable of separation for analysis, in which case the process may be treated as 1 policy or practice. It also provides that if the covered entity shows a specific policy or practice does not cause the disparate impact, the entity need not prove that policy is necessary to achieve its goals, and that necessity may not be used as a defense to intentional discrimination claims. It defines “demonstrates” to mean meeting both the burdens of production and persuasion.

This section revises the Age Discrimination Act of 1975 to conform its enforcement provisions to those in Title VI and Title IX by (1) authorizing a person aggrieved to recover equitable and legal relief, including compensatory and punitive damages, attorney’s fees, expert fees, and costs in actions alleging intentional discrimination or disparate impact, while barring punitive damages against a government, government agency, or political subdivision; (2) requiring that plaintiff attorney’s fees be included in any settlement agreement or consent decree; (3) changing the private right of action provision to allow suits to “redress a violation” rather than only to “enjoin a violation” and directing courts to award costs and a reasonable attorney’s fee, including expert fees, to the prevailing plaintiff; and (4) allowing actions to be initiated either in court or before the relevant Federal department or agency, while removing the requirement that a plaintiff wait longer than 180 days to seek agency review.

This section establishes a federal prohibition on profiling by law enforcement agents and agencies, defined to include Federal, State, local, and Indian tribal officials and governmental bodies engaged in criminal, immigration, or customs enforcement. It defines “profiling” as relying, to any degree, on actual or perceived race, ethnicity, national origin, religion, sex, gender identity, or sexual orientation when selecting individuals for routine or spontaneous investigatory activities or determining the scope of law enforcement activity after an initial inquiry, except when trustworthy, locality- and time-specific information links a person with a described characteristic to an identified criminal incident or scheme. It also defines “routine or spontaneous investigatory activities” to include interviews, traffic stops, pedestrian stops, frisks, searches, data collection and predicated investigations, more extensive inspections of entrants into the United States, immigration-related workplace investigations, and other encounters compiled by the Federal Bureau of Investigation or the Department of Justice Bureau of Justice Statistics. This section authorizes the United States or an individual injured by profiling to bring a civil action for equitable or legal relief in State court of general jurisdiction or in federal district court. It allows relief against the governmental body that employed the offending agent, the agent who engaged in profiling, and any supervisor with authority over that agent. It provides that proof of disparate impact in a jurisdiction’s routine or spontaneous investigatory activities on individuals with a protected characteristic constitutes prima facie evidence of a violation. It also permits a prevailing plaintiff, other than the United States, to recover reasonable attorney’s fees, including expert fees, in an action against a governmental body.

This section expands Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to prohibit discrimination in public accommodations on the basis of sex, including sexual orientation and gender identity, and broadens the covered establishments to include, among others, stores, shopping centers, online retailers or service providers, salons, banks, gas stations, food banks, service or care centers, shelters, travel agencies, funeral parlors, health care providers, accounting and legal services, and transportation services such as train, bus, car, taxi, and airline services. It also adds statutory definitions and rules of construction clarifying that sex includes pregnancy, childbirth, related medical conditions, sex stereotypes, sexual orientation, gender identity, and sex characteristics, and that race includes traits historically associated with race, including natural hair texture and protective hairstyles. The section further provides that remedies for sex discrimination involving pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions may not be less substantial than other sex-discrimination remedies, and that individuals may not be denied access to shared facilities, including restrooms, locker rooms, and dressing rooms, based on gender identity. Finally, it preserves claims and remedies under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and other laws, and bars the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 from being used as a claim or defense to challenge the title’s application or enforcement.

This section revises Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by making an employer liable for any act of discrimination prohibited under the title, including harassment, intimidation, or retaliation, committed by any of its employees. It also eliminates the Faragher-Ellerth affirmative defense and related arguments by providing that it is not a defense, or a basis for challenging enforcement, that an employer exercised reasonable care to prevent or correct sex-based discrimination, that no adverse employment action was taken, or that the affected employee did not use preventive opportunities to avoid harm.

This section prohibits predispute arbitration agreements and predispute joint-action waivers from being enforced for employment disputes, consumer disputes, and civil rights disputes, and requires courts—not arbitrators—to decide whether the new chapter applies to a dispute and whether an agreement is valid and enforceable. As background, the new chapter in title 9 of the U.S. Code defines an employment dispute broadly to include disputes arising from the work relationship or prospective work relationship, including disputes over terms of work, pay, recruiting, referral, discipline, or discharge, regardless of whether a worker is classified as an employee or independent contractor; defines a consumer dispute as a dispute involving individuals seeking or acquiring property, services, securities, investments, money, or credit for personal, family, or household purposes; and defines a civil rights dispute as a dispute alleging violations of the U.S. Constitution, a state constitution, or federal, state, or local antidiscrimination laws covering race, sex, age, gender identity, sexual orientation, disability, religion, national origin, or other legally protected status. Thus, predispute agreements could not require arbitration or bar participation in class, collective, or joint actions before a dispute arises. The section also makes conforming amendments to the Federal Arbitration Act, including revising section 1 to apply regardless of whether individuals are labeled employees or independent contractors and amending section 2 to recognize the new chapter 4 exception.

This section revises the civil rights cause of action under Revised Statute 1979 (42 U.S.C. 1983) by inserting “of the United States or” before “of any State,” thereby extending liability to deprivations of constitutional or statutory rights committed under color of federal law as well as state, territorial, or District of Columbia law. It also establishes rules for applying the provision by: (1) defining “State” to include any person or entity acting under color of state, territorial, or District of Columbia law; (2) specifying when a private person or entity acts under color of law, including when it performs a public function, acts in concert or joint action with government, engages in a conspiracy, has a close nexus with government, is so entwined with government that it is fairly considered a state actor, or exercises powers traditionally reserved to government; (3) creating a presumption that a private person or entity acts under color of law when, under a contract or other legally binding agreement with the United States or a state or local government, it exercises governmental power or administers specified functions, including the judiciary, law enforcement, public education, jails or prisons, elections, municipal water services, municipal waste removal, evictions, public parks, or public benefits programs; (4) eliminating qualified immunity as a defense in actions brought under the revised statute against persons acting under color of federal, state, territorial, or District of Columbia law; and (5) providing that an official of a political subdivision of the United States or of a State may be sued under the Act and that the political subdivision may be held liable for that official’s acts, whether the official acted in an official or individual capacity.

This section revises the Civil Rights Act of 1964’s prohibition on discrimination in federally assisted programs by specifying that the statute’s waiver of sovereign immunity applies to the provisions of any rule made to implement the listed civil rights statutes. (Thus, States and other recipients of Federal financial assistance may be sued for violations of implementing regulations, not only the underlying statutory provisions.)

This section provides that nothing in this Act, including any amendment made by this Act, may be construed to limit the scope of, or the relief available under, section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. 794), the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq.), or any other provision of law. It also provides that nothing in the Act may be construed to limit the scope of the class of persons who may be subjected to civil actions under the covered civil rights provisions, establishes severability so that any unconstitutional provision or application does not affect the remainder of the Act, and clarifies that the Act does not prohibit voluntary arbitration after a dispute arises.

This section provides that the Act and its amendments take effect on the date of enactment and apply to all actions or proceedings pending on or after that date. It also provides that section 8 and the amendments made by that section apply only to disputes or claims that arise or accrue on or after the date of enactment.