H.R. 3225 — Belarus Democracy, Human Rights, and Sovereignty Act of 2025

This section revises the congressional findings in Section 2 of the Belarus Democracy Act of 2004 by replacing the prior six findings on the former Soviet states with 21 new findings. The new findings detail Belarus's ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; Alyaksandr Lukashenka's undemocratic rule since 1994 and fraudulent elections (e.g., 2006, 2010, 2020); U.S. and international responses including sanctions, resolutions, and nonrecognition of Lukashenka; ongoing government repression of activists, protesters, media, internet access, and civil society; violent crackdowns post-2020 election (e.g., over 1,400 injured, 37,000 detained); and Belarus's subservience to Russia via the "Union State."

This section revises the statement of policy in the Belarus Democracy Act of 2004 to condemn (1) the August 9, 2020, Belarusian presidential election and subsequent crackdowns on opposition, protesters, journalists, and others; (2) Belarusian support for Russia's war against Ukraine, including hosting Russian nuclear weapons and forces, child abductions, and use of Belarusian territory as a staging ground; (3) the weaponization of migrants at Poland and Lithuania borders; and (4) deprivation of consular services to Belarusians abroad. It declares further U.S. policy to demand release of all political prisoners; stand in solidarity with and support the Belarusian people's aspirations for democracy, independence, human rights, and rule of law; refuse recognition of Alyaksandr Lukashenka's regime and support free, fair 2025 presidential and parliamentary elections under OSCE standards; recognize the Coordination Council and United Transitional Cabinet for power transition; coordinate targeted sanctions with allies; urge fulfillment of OSCE and UN obligations; call for international accountability; appoint a U.S. Special Envoy for Belarus; and utilize the U.S.-Belarus Strategic Dialogue to promote accountability and partnerships with the Belarusian people.

This section amends Section 4 of the Belarus Democracy Act of 2004 to promote democracy, civil society, and sovereignty in Belarus by (1) expanding assistance eligibility in subsection (a)(1) to include the United Transitional Cabinet and the Coordination Council (in addition to the Republic of Belarus) and adding a new purpose in subsection (a)(5) to assist in the cessation of Belarus' support for Russia's unprovoked war of aggression in Ukraine; (2) specifying in subsection (b) that assistance includes political party strengthening; (3) revising subsection (c) to authorize support for 18 specified activities, including independent media development, countering internet censorship, raising awareness of the Lukashenka regime's complicity in Russia's war against Ukraine, civil society and human rights programs, defense of Belarusian sovereignty, democratic political parties, free elections, women advocates, Belarusian cultural preservation, private sector development (particularly information technology), political refugees, exiled education, and human rights investigations; (4) updating subsection (f) to reference the Belarus Democracy, Human Rights, and Sovereignty Act of 2025 (from 2020) and requiring reporting on the methodology and benchmarks for assessing fund effectiveness; and (5) authorizing appropriations in subsection (g) for FY2026 at not less than the FY2025 amount made available and for FY2027 at not less than the FY2026 amount.

This section revises Section 5 of the Belarus Democracy Act of 2004 (P.L. 109-480) as follows: (1) in subsection (a), it modifies paragraph (5) to state that the United States should advocate for the release of journalists detained for political reasons; and adds paragraph (6) stating that the United States should support independent media outlets and other sources of information in providing accurate and truthful information about Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine and the Lukashenka regime’s complicity therein; and (2) strikes subsection (b).

This section amends sanctions provisions against the government of Belarus under Section 6 of the Belarus Democracy Act of 2004 by (1) requiring the President to maintain sanctions imposed under Executive Orders 13405, 14024, and 14038 (relating to blocking property of persons undermining democracy in Belarus and contributing to the situation there) until certifying significant progress on specified conditions; (2) adding to those conditions the withdrawal of Russian armed forces from Belarus, cessation of Belarusian support for Russia's war against Ukraine, and return of all Ukrainian children abducted to Belarus; (3) expanding mandatory visa ineligibility ("shall" instead of "may") to additional categories of persons, including Belarusian officials persecuting religious groups, human rights defenders, opposition, or media; those enabling Russian interference in Belarus; officials facilitating Ukrainian child abductions or Russian use of Belarusian territory for its invasion of Ukraine; "Union State" officials; and certain Russians involved in Belarus's crackdown; and (4) requiring asset blocking on specified foreign persons (e.g., Central Election Commission members manipulating the 2020 election, child abductors, invasion supporters) and authorizing it for Belarusian senior leaders, their family members, and business associates deriving significant benefit from such policies.

This section amends Section 7 of the Belarus Democracy Act of 2004 on multilateral cooperation by adding a new paragraph (3) to halt the Government of Belarus, led illegally by Alyaksandr Lukashenka, from supporting and assisting the Russian Federation’s unprovoked war of aggression against Ukraine, including the abduction and deportation of Ukrainian children.

This section revises reporting requirements in Section 8 of the Belarus Democracy Act of 2004 by (1) striking subsection (a); (2) redesignating subsection (b) as subsection (a); (3) in subsection (a) as redesignated, (A) updating the referenced statute from the Belarus Democracy, Human Rights, and Sovereignty Act of 2020 to the Belarus Democracy, Human Rights, and Sovereignty Act of 2025, and adding a requirement to report whether the United States has imposed sanctions on identified senior foreign political figures; (B) striking paragraph (2); and (C) redesignating paragraph (3) as paragraph (2); and (4) adding a new subsection (b) requiring the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury and the Secretary of State, to submit to the appropriate congressional committees, not later than 90 days after enactment of the Belarus Democracy, Human Rights, and Sovereignty Act of 2025, an unclassified report (with a possible classified annex) assessing Belarus's support for Russia's war against Ukraine—including Russian military and nuclear presence in Belarus and its NATO implications; Belarusian harboring of Wagner Group or other Russian paramilitaries; Belarusian role in abducting and deporting Ukrainian children (including Red Cross involvement) and a sanctions strategy for accountability; weapons purchases from Russia and Iran and potential violations of the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (22 U.S.C. 9406, 9525); Belarusian facilitation of Russian sanctions evasion and export control circumvention (including dual-use goods value and involved persons); and Belarus's use of migrants to destabilize NATO borders such as those of Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland.

This section amends definitions in sec. 9 of the Belarus Democracy Act of 2004 (P.L. 109-480) by (1) inserting in paragraph (3)(A), before the semicolon, the phrase ", led illegally by Alyaksandr Lukashenka"; and (2) adding paragraph (4) to define "Union State" as the supranational union of the Republic of Belarus and the Russian Federation as outlined in their December 1999 Treaty on the establishment of the Union State.