H.R. 4107 — GOLDEN DOME Act of 2025

This section states congressional findings on expanding missile threats to the U.S. homeland from adversaries including China, Russia, and North Korea—citing the 2022 Missile Defense Review, the October 2023 Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, and the July 2024 Commission on the National Defense Strategy—and declares it U.S. policy to deploy a next-generation missile defense shield, deter homeland attacks, and guarantee secure second-strike capability. It expresses the sense of Congress that the Department of Defense must prioritize rapid development and deployment of space-based sensors and interceptors, full integration of sensors across domains, clear delineation of responsibilities, and achievement of total domain awareness to counter these threats through a "Golden Dome" system.

This section defines terms used in the Act, including (1) commercial solution, as a product (other than real property) customarily used by the general public or nongovernmental entities that has been or is offered for sale, lease, or license to the public and includes commercial products, components, and services; (2) congressional defense committees, as defined in 10 U.S.C. §101(a); (3) Golden Dome, as the holistic missile defense architecture described in the Act; (4) missile, to encompass ballistic, hypersonic, cruise, hypersonic cruise, or loitering munitions; (5) Program Manager, as the Golden Dome Direct Report Program Manager appointed under section 4(a)(4)(A); (6) Secretary, as the Secretary of Defense; and (7) unmanned system, as a remote-operated or autonomous system of any size operating in land, sea, air, or space capable of single attacks, swarm attacks, or sensor and data collection and reconnaissance.

This section directs the Secretary of Defense to develop, within one year of enactment, a holistic missile defense strategy for defending critical infrastructure against adversaries' missiles and unmanned systems. The strategy must include (1) layered sensors from seafloor to space and cyberspace for all-domain awareness; (2) integrated, secure, open, and redundant command-and-control architecture with a clear human chain of command; (3) a plan for distributed, advanced, or additive manufacturing of critical technologies and munitions; and (4) maximum use of commercial solutions. This section further establishes a Golden Dome Direct Report Program Manager—appointed by the Secretary from specified general or flag officers, serving at the grade of general, and reporting directly to the Deputy Secretary of Defense—who is responsible for Golden Dome acquisition, development, testing, operations, and sustainment. The Program Manager has broad authorities equivalent to a Defense Acquisition Executive (including milestone decision, contracting, hiring, classification, military construction, and budgeting across all budget categories), is exempt from the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System Manual and DoD Directive 5000.01 (or successors), is protected from intervention except by the President, Secretary, or statute, and may collaborate with other federal agencies (e.g., DHS, FCC, FAA, intelligence community) on a priority basis. This section requires a robust testing regime for Golden Dome kinetic and nonkinetic interceptors, including end-to-end detection, tracking, and destruction exercises, with a demanding cadence beginning no later than 540 days after enactment (commencing with a virtual exercise).

This section adds a new section 4821 to chapter 382 of title 10, U.S. Code, requiring the head of an agency, to the maximum extent practicable, to (1) ensure space acquisitions employ procedures that maximize competition; (2) procure mission-critical national security space-based systems delivering tactical data from low Earth orbit through open competition among multiple vendors, with those vendors’ products complying with interfaces and standards that maximize resilience and interoperability with Department of Defense systems; and (3) require any contract or as-a-service agreement for such a system to demonstrate competitive performance, cost, and delivery speed compared to existing programs it seeks to replace, while using reasonable best efforts to avoid the agreement if it would cause a major contraction in the space industrial base. The section further requires agency heads to direct acquisition, contracting, and procurement officials to develop guidance achieving these requirements, delivering systems in accordance with government standards and interfaces, and preventing major reductions or consolidation of the space industrial base.

This section expands the Department of Defense's (DOD) authority to mitigate unmanned aircraft system or unmanned aircraft threats to covered facilities or assets by (1) specifying exemptions from additional criminal statutes in 18 U.S.C. §§32, 1030, and 1367 and chapters 119 and 206 (in addition to prior exemptions from other title 18 provisions and 49 U.S.C. §46502); (2) requiring the Secretary of Defense to delegate such authority to combatant commanders, service secretaries, or other appropriate DOD officials; (3) authorizing warnings to UAS operators via remote identification broadcasts or other means; (4) expanding covered facilities or assets to include those where DOD actions would support other federal agencies authorized to mitigate UAS threats; (5) exempting related technologies, procedures, and guidance from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. §552(b)(3)) and state or local disclosure laws; and (6) exempting DOD and Coast Guard UAS mitigation activities conducted outside the United States from the aforementioned criminal statutes and 49 U.S.C. §46502. The section further (1) extends the sunset date for the authority to December 31, 2030 (from December 31, 2026); (2) extends the post-sunset assessment period to one year (from 180 days) with a report due by November 15, 2030 (from November 15, 2026); (3) adds specified congressional committees to annual reporting requirements; and (4) expands the definition of covered facilities or assets to include additional DOD properties (e.g., those under 10 U.S.C. §2672), WMD incident response, certain readiness activities (10 U.S.C. §2692(b)), and time- and location-limited emergency responses. (As background, 10 U.S.C. §130i authorizes DOD personnel to detect, disrupt, seize, or destroy UAS posing threats to covered assets without prior consent, overriding select aviation and communications laws.)

This section authorizes $23,023,100,000 for FY2026 to carry out this Act, allocating specified amounts as follows: (1) $500,000,000 for SM–3 Block 1B requirements; (2) $500,000,000 for SM–3 Block IIA requirements; (3) $1,000,000,000 for development, testing, and additional procurement of ground mobile interceptors and radars; (4) $1,500,000,000 for PAC–2 and PAC–3 munitions and MM–104 Patriot batteries; (5) $500,000,000 for Alaska-based Aegis Ashore station construction; (6) $460,000,000 for Next Generation Interceptor production and expansion of missile interceptor fields at Fort Greely, Alaska, to up to 80 units; (7) $260,000,000 for construction of an additional Next Generation Interceptor site in the continental United States; (8) $250,000,000 for completion and certification of Hawaii Aegis Ashore system and upgrades to the Maui Space Surveillance Complex; (9) $100,000,000 for Space Development Agency satellite sensors; (10) $750,000,000 for modernization of terrestrial-based domain awareness radars; (11) $2,500,000,000 for research and development of non-kinetic missile defense capabilities across the military departments; (12) $5,900,000,000 for research, development, and deployment of space-based missile defense and sensor networks; (13) $3,100,000,000 for procurement of Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor space vehicles; (14) $63,100,000 for Missile Defense Complex and Fire Team Readiness Facility; (15) $50,000,000 for procurement and fielding of dirigibles; (16) $750,000,000 for innovation and modernization of all domain sensor capabilities, including $76,000,000 for a machine learning and artificial intelligence information and data fusion platform; (17) $450,000,000 for counter-hypersonic programs for advanced glide phase interceptors; (18) $1,500,000,000 for research, development, and deployment of positioning, navigation, and timing systems; (19) $90,000,000 for procurement and fielding of the Integrated Undersea Sensor System; (20) $2,500,000,000 for procurement and fielding of air moving target indicator systems; (21) $100,000,000 for integrated command and control software and technology architecture; (22) $75,000,000 for development and fielding of a new low-cost, highly scalable ground interceptor; and (23) $125,000,000 for development and fielding of autonomous agents to defend against cruise missile threats and unmanned systems.