“To provide for working with allies to seek increased compliance by China with certain OECD export credit standards.”
No CRS summary available for this bill.
This section requires the Secretary of the Treasury, within 180 days of enactment, to submit to the House Financial Services Committee and Senate Banking Committee a strategy and timeline for (1) strengthening U.S. cooperation with allies to ensure China's compliance with the OECD Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits (i.e., multilateral guidelines limiting government-backed export financing to prevent subsidies) and (2) achieving the goal in Section 11(a)(1) of the Export-Import Bank Reauthorization Act of 2012 (12 U.S.C. 635a note). The section amends such Section 11 by (1) revising subsection (a)(1) to establish a firm "goal" (from "possible goal") of eliminating China's inconsistent export subsidies before 10 years after enactment of this Act (previously, the 2015 EXIM reauthorization); (2) extending the progress report deadline in subsection (e) to 2029 (from 2019); and (3) throughout the section, replacing the President with the Secretary of the Treasury (in consultation with the U.S. Trade Representative in subsections (a) and (d)) as the lead negotiator and requiring negotiations to occur not less frequently than twice per year.
This section directs the Secretary of the Treasury, in determining whether the People's Republic of China has manipulated its currency exchange rate with the U.S. dollar, to consider (1) China's compliance with Article VIII of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Articles of Agreement (i.e., avoiding restrictive payments practices), (2) transparency of China's exchange rate management, and (3) significant Chinese government support for economic sectors that impedes balance-of-payments adjustments; and authorizes such a determination regardless of China's global current account surplus. (Thus, this modifies Treasury's existing currency manipulation criteria, which also include bilateral U.S. trade surpluses exceeding $20 billion, current account surpluses exceeding 2% of GDP, and persistent one-sided foreign exchange intervention.) It further requires the Secretary, for one year following such a determination, to instruct the U.S. IMF Governor to oppose any proposal to increase China's IMF quota (i.e., its share of voting power and Fund resources), except consent to a legally authorized amendment to the IMF Articles of Agreement.