H.R. 7613 — ALERT Act

This section directs the FAA Administrator, not later than 180 days after enactment, to complete an evaluation of the hazards and safety benefits of decreasing the traffic advisory and resolution advisory inhibit altitudes in Airborne Collision Avoidance System Xa (ACAS Xa)—a next-generation midair collision avoidance system—to enable improved alerting throughout more of an aircraft's flight maneuvering envelope than required under RTCA minimum operational performance standards (DO-385A, issued June 22, 2023). In conducting the evaluation, the Administrator must consult with specified stakeholders, including air carriers under parts 121, 135, and 91 of title 14, Code of Federal Regulations; cargo carriers; manufacturers; unions; human factors experts; the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB); and others, and consider at a minimum safety benefits such as reduced midair collision risk; risks of false or overlapping alerts to pilots and air traffic controllers; technological advances to limit nuisance alerts; air traffic control procedures and training requirements; human factors; and NTSB research in Aviation Investigation Report AIR-26-02 (adopted January 27, 2026).

This section directs the FAA Administrator to establish, not later than 45 days after enactment, an aviation rulemaking committee to develop recommendations for requiring selected aircraft to be equipped with integrated ACAS Xa (Airborne Collision Avoidance System Xa)—using both ADS-B In and transponder interrogations per RTCA DO-385A standards (issued June 22, 2023) and providing visual and audible alerts—with a report due to the FAA and congressional committees not later than 1 year after the committee's establishment. Not later than the earlier of 18 months after the report or 32 months after enactment, the Administrator must issue a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) prohibiting operation of selected aircraft without compliant ACAS Xa, including (1) certification guidance; (2) a deadline not exceeding December 31, 2031, for newly manufactured selected aircraft; (3) a deadline not exceeding December 31, 2031, for retrofitting existing selected aircraft; (4) if needed for software/hardware upgrades or training per updated standards, a deadline not exceeding December 31, 2033; and (5) a process for 2-year extensions with a report to Congress assuring no safety compromise. The Administrator must issue a final rule not later than 1 year after the NPRM and, not later than 30 days thereafter, update ACAS Xa minimal operational performance standards based on evaluations under section 101. (As background, ACAS Xa upgrades existing traffic collision avoidance systems to enhance mid-air collision protection using modern surveillance technologies.)

This section directs the FAA Administrator, by December 31, 2026, to finalize and publish minimum operational performance standards for Airborne Collision Avoidance System Xr (ACAS Xr)—a collision avoidance system for rotorcraft and powered-lift aircraft that uses ADS-B In and a second independent source of target data such as transponder interrogations—through the appropriate standards-setting organization. The section further requires the Administrator to establish an aviation rulemaking committee by 30 days after those standards are published or January 31, 2027 (whichever is earlier), consisting of specified stakeholders (e.g., rotorcraft operators under parts 91 and 135, manufacturers, air medical services, and aviation safety experts), to develop recommendations on requiring selected rotorcraft and powered-lift aircraft to be equipped with ACAS Xr providing visual and audible alerts; the committee must submit a report to the Administrator and congressional committees within one year considering factors such as safety benefits, certification timelines, retrofit costs, and interactions with existing systems. Finally, by 18 months after the committee report or 24 months after enactment (whichever is earlier), the Administrator must issue a notice of proposed rulemaking to prohibit operations of selected rotorcraft and powered-lift aircraft unless equipped with ACAS Xr per the standards and must modify those standards to enhance aural alerts (adding clock position, relative altitude, range, and vertical tendency) and visual displays (integrating directional traffic symbols).

This section directs the FAA Administrator to issue, not later than two years after enactment of this Act, a final rule requiring covered aircraft to be equipped and operating with collision prevention technology, with an effective date not later than December 31, 2031. In developing the rule, the Administrator must consult with air carriers (under parts 121, 135, and 91 of FAA regulations), aviation organizations and manufacturers (including helicopter, general aviation, business, experimental, transport category, rotorcraft, powered-lift, and avionics), aircraft modification providers, air traffic controller and aviation safety inspector representatives, airline pilot unions, human factors experts, the National Transportation Safety Board, and other appropriate entities; and consider safety benefits, ADS-B In technologies and software (including traffic advisories, movement prediction, and weather integration), air traffic control modernization, controller training needs, certification requirements, supply chain capacity, and results of specified ADS-B studies. The rule must (1) establish performance requirements tailored to aircraft types and operations (including visual and audible alerts, human factors, jamming/spoofing resiliency, and antenna placement); (2) identify or issue relevant guidance or technical standard orders; and (3) allow any available collision prevention technology—including portable ADS-B In receivers or displays on electronic flight bags or panel mounts—that provides an equivalent level of safety.

This section prohibits any person, governmental agency, or other entity from using Automatic Dependent Surveillance–Broadcast (ADS–B) data to identify aircraft for the purpose of obtaining revenue from the owner or operator without such owner's or operator's consent (while permitting air traffic controllers to use ADS–B data for tracking aircraft and improving air traffic safety and efficiency). It also amends 49 U.S.C. 46101(c)(1) to prohibit not only the Federal Aviation Administration Administrator but also any other Federal, State, local, territorial, or Tribal official from using ADS–B data to assess or collect taxes, fees, or charges on aircraft operations (previously limited to the FAA Administrator).

This section requires the Secretary of Transportation to establish and maintain a public dashboard on the Department of Transportation website displaying information on rulemakings required by §§102, 103, and 104, including (1) publication dates and links to minimum operating performance standards; (2) rulemaking committee establishment dates, rosters, and tasking documents; (3) deadlines and actual submission dates for committee reports; (4) publication dates and links to advanced notices, notices of proposed rulemakings, and revised notices; (5) public comment period dates and links to comments; (6) final rule publication dates and links; (7) correspondence with the National Transportation Safety Board on safety recommendations; and (8) additional transparency information determined by the Secretary. The section further directs the Administrator to brief appropriate congressional committees and families of victims of the midair collision described in National Transportation Safety Board Aviation Investigation Report AIR–26–02 (adopted January 27, 2026) on rulemaking progress not later than 180 days after enactment and every 180 days thereafter until final rules are issued. It also requires, if the Administrator misses any deadline in §§102, 103, or 104, an in-person briefing to congressional committees within four weeks (with outreach beginning within four days), in a format and at a time determined by the committees.

This section directs the FAA Administrator, not later than one year after enactment and in coordination with organizations representing air traffic controller managers and supervisors, to establish time-on-position limits for operations supervisory personnel (i.e., managerial personnel responsible for the direct supervision of air traffic control operational personnel). In developing these limits, the Administrator must (1) prioritize evaluation and establishment of limits at Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport and other facilities with high volumes of mixed rotorcraft and airplane traffic; (2) develop guidance for district and facility-level management to adapt limits based on local staffing and procedures; (3) consider operational needs, staffing levels, controller-in-charge positions (i.e., bargaining unit specialists providing watch supervision when supervisors are unavailable), specified FAA orders, human factors data, and other relevant items; and (4) consult, as appropriate, with the exclusive bargaining representative of air traffic controllers. The section includes a rule of construction preserving existing collective bargaining agreements and defines key terms including controller-in-charge and operational oversight (i.e., leading air traffic services through engagement, awareness, and accountability).

This section requires the FAA Administrator, not later than 9 months after enactment and in coordination with air traffic controllers' exclusive bargaining representative, to develop and implement instructor-led, scenario-based initial, recurrent, and refresher training on threat and error management (TEM)—a safety framework for identifying and mitigating operational threats and errors as defined in the FAA Risk Management Handbook—for air traffic controllers. In developing the training, the Administrator must consult representatives of air traffic control managers and supervisors, aviation safety experts in human factors and TEM best practices, and an NTSB subject matter expert as observer; consider at a minimum specified NTSB findings (e.g., from report AIR–26–02), FAA orders (e.g., JO 3120.4S, JO 7210.3EE, JO 7110.65BB), training frequency (potentially increased for high-complexity airspace), data analytics, simulators, safety reporting data, and other factors; revise those FAA orders (or successors) and related policies within 90 days of development to incorporate the training; and brief congressional committees within one year on implementation of this and related training requirements (§109) and potential improvements.

This section directs the FAA Administrator, not later than 270 days after the date of enactment and in coordination with air traffic controllers' exclusive bargaining representative, to develop and implement instructor-led, scenario-based initial, recurrent, and refresher training for air traffic controllers on tower-applied and pilot-applied visual separation procedures (i.e., maintaining aircraft separation through direct visual observation). In developing the training, the Administrator must consult representatives of aviation safety inspectors and engineers, airline and general aviation pilots, air traffic control managers and supervisors, and aviation safety experts on human factors and visual separation; and consider, at a minimum, specified NTSB findings (including AIR-26/02, adopted January 27, 2026), FAA orders (JO 3120.4S, JO 7210.3EE, and JO 7110.65BB), training frequency (including for high-complexity airspace), simulator technologies and data analytics, aviation safety reporting data, and other relevant factors. Not later than 90 days after developing the training, the Administrator must revise those FAA orders (or successors) and related policy and guidance materials to reflect these requirements.

This section requires the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Administrator to develop, not later than 180 days after enactment, a safety risk assessment tool for air traffic controllers and supervisory personnel to identify airspace risks, analyze and prioritize them, and develop real-time mitigation strategies. In developing the tool, the Administrator must consider specified factors (e.g., threat and error management best practices; findings from National Transportation Safety Board report AIR–26–02, the National Airspace System Safety Review Team report, and a frontline manager workload study under the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024; facility staffing; prior FAA guidance; foreign practices; and commercial technologies) and coordinate with air traffic control supervisors and managers, the controllers' exclusive bargaining representative, aviation safety experts, Federal contract tower operators, and other stakeholders. This section further requires the Administrator to brief the appropriate congressional committees not later than 18 months after enactment on the tool's development, implementation progress, and deployment recommendations. The section mandates phased deployment of the tool: (1) at the Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport air traffic control tower not later than one year after development; (2) at facilities with high volumes of mixed rotorcraft and airplane traffic not later than 18 months after development; and (3) at all remaining air traffic control facilities not later than two years after development.

This section directs the FAA Administrator to initiate, not later than 30 days after enactment, an assessment of aircraft arrival rates at Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport, considering factors such as airspace complexity, airfield limitations, traffic volume, and current hourly instrument flight rules (IFR) slot allocations (i.e., limits on scheduled takeoffs and landings to manage congestion, noise, and safety). The Administrator must complete the assessment and submit it with findings and recommendations to the appropriate congressional committees not later than 180 days after initiation. Not later than 30 days after completion, the Administrator must initiate rulemaking—after consulting air carriers, air traffic controllers, the Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority, and other stakeholders—to update slot regulations (14 CFR part 93, subpart K) by prescribing allocated IFR operations in periods of no more than 30 minutes to ensure the airport does not exceed safe capacity.

This section directs the FAA Administrator to implement operational use of the time-based flow management system—which assigns scheduled times of arrival to optimize aircraft sequencing—at Potomac Consolidated Terminal Radar Approach Control and associated air traffic control towers not later than 180 days after enactment.

This section directs the FAA Administrator and the exclusive bargaining representative of air traffic controllers (the "Parties") to jointly review, at their election, criteria and procedures for assessing air traffic control facility pay levels (i.e., factors determining controller salaries based on facility traffic volume and complexity), considering variables such as technological advancements, aviation trends, and traffic count index formulas. It prohibits implementation of facility pay level changes due to data source changes until collective bargaining negotiations under the relevant agreement and 49 U.S.C. are completed and requires application of any agreed standards at Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport and all other air traffic control facilities, prioritizing those with high volumes of mixed rotorcraft and airplane traffic. It clarifies that nothing in the section interferes with existing agreements between agencies and air traffic controller representatives.

This section directs the FAA Administrator to convene, not later than 3 months after enactment, a working group to evaluate the safety benefits and risks of requiring all aircraft to use the same communications frequency during periods when helicopter and local air traffic control positions are combined at Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport's tower. The working group comprises representatives from air traffic controller bargaining units, supervisors, Part 121 pilot organizations (at least three), air medical services, helicopter and business aviation operators, Part 121 air carriers (all local to the DC Metropolitan Area Special Flight Rules Area), a human factors expert, FAA, DoD, Coast Guard, and NTSB (with specified government representatives nonvoting and non-political appointees); it must consider at least 11 factors including situation awareness, human factors, training requirements, technological challenges, communication risks, NTSB recommendations (e.g., from Aviation Investigation Report AIR-26-02), and operator feedback. The working group has an initial 1-year duration (extendable by 1 year), after which it must submit a report with findings and recommendations to the Administrator and appropriate congressional committees not later than 6 months after conclusion; the Administrator must operationally validate the recommendations and may implement them as appropriate not later than 6 months after receipt.

This section directs the FAA Administrator to initiate, not later than 30 days after the date of enactment, an assessment of the feasibility, maturity, hazards, and safety benefits of technology that alerts air traffic controllers or flight crews to potentially blocked radio transmissions during simultaneous broadcasting. In conducting the assessment, the Administrator must consider at minimum (1) domestic and international technologies in use and their standards, (2) proposed technologies and needed standards, (3) potential benefits and limitations, (4) air traffic controller training requirements, (5) FAA air traffic control modernization efforts, and (6) effects on controller situational awareness; and consult with air traffic controller representatives, supervisors, aviation safety inspectors and engineers, air traffic management manufacturers, helicopter and general aviation operators, and other appropriate entities. Not later than one year after enactment, the Administrator must submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees containing (1) lists of identified and proposed technologies, (2) simulation and testing results, and (3) if safely feasible, an implementation plan with scope of upgrades, predicted costs, projected timeline, and prioritization.

This section establishes a Task Force, to be convened by the FAA Administrator not later than 3 months after enactment, to develop a framework with priorities, goals, timeline, and recommendations for improving the air traffic controller conflict alert system to provide more salient alerts based on conflict severity. The Task Force includes representatives from air traffic controller bargaining units, supervisors and managers, Contract Tower Program operators (nonvoting), aviation safety inspectors and engineers, human factors experts, operational and academic specialists (nonvoting), FAA personnel with procurement expertise (nonvoting if from another agency), and others as determined by the Administrator; it has an initial 1-year duration, extendable by up to 6 months. In developing the framework, the Task Force must consider at minimum air traffic controller situational awareness (including nuisance alerts), system consolidation (e.g., via Enterprise Information Display System), related working group products, training, technology advances and limitations, NTSB recommendations, FAA modernization efforts, and feedback from equipment manufacturers. Not later than 4 months after the Task Force concludes, it must submit the framework report to the FAA Administrator and appropriate congressional committees. Not later than 8 months after receiving the report, the Administrator must submit to those committees an implementation plan—including specific air traffic controller training requirements per named FAA orders (JO 3120.4S and JO 7210.3EE or successors) and a prioritized public list of airports for upgrades—with a timeline not exceeding 2 years; the Administrator must begin implementation immediately upon plan submission and provide briefings to the committees 6 months later and every 6 months thereafter until full implementation.

This section expresses the sense of Congress that the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Administrator abide by DOT Order 3910.1D (or successor) for postaccident and postincident drug and alcohol testing; directs the Administrator to revise Air Traffic Organization procedures within 180 days of enactment to enable timely on-site supervisor determinations of testing needs without awaiting investigation or approval; and requires annual training on the revised procedures for relevant staff, to be incorporated within one year of enactment and including postlearning assessments. The section further requires the Secretary of Transportation, within one year of enactment and annually thereafter, to review each FAA-operated air traffic control facility's ability to initiate testing within two hours for alcohol and four hours for drugs—including demonstrations of collection times at lowest resource availability—and to submit reports to congressional committees within three months detailing results, facilities needing remediation, prior progress, and remediation plans, with the Administrator to mitigate identified barriers.

This section directs the FAA Administrator, not later than 90 days after enactment, to evaluate charted helicopter routes near Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport using the safety risk management process in FAA Order JO 8040.4C (or successor). Upon completion of each evaluation, the Administrator must revise routes as necessary to ensure safe deconfliction with fixed-wing aircraft routes—either physically at all times or through positive control procedures—and conduct a safety risk management review for any changes. Not later than 120 days after completing all evaluations and revisions, the Administrator must report to the appropriate congressional committees on the evaluation results, route revisions and explanations, and review documentation.

This section requires the FAA Administrator to ensure that each segment of a helicopter route chart includes recommended flight altitudes, including ceilings and floors, consistent with FAA Order JO 7210.3EE (Facility Operation and Administration). It directs amendment of that order within 60 days of enactment to add minimum vertical separation requirements to the helicopter route chart program criteria and a further update to the order within 90 days to reflect changes made by this section. The section also requires helicopter charts near airports to clearly depict route segments, recommended altitudes and instructions conveying minimum vertical separation—per FAA Order JO 7110.65BB (Air Traffic Control)—between helicopters or powered-lift aircraft and fixed-wing aircraft during critical phases of flight (i.e., takeoff and landing); such changes must be assessed annually as part of the review in section 120.

This section requires the FAA Administrator to initiate a review of criteria for annual Helicopter Route Chart reviews (i.e., charts depicting designated helicopter routes in terminal areas to separate helicopters from fixed-wing traffic and minimize noise), not later than 180 days after enactment and annually thereafter, with updates published on the FAA website. (Thus, criteria must also reflect changes to FAA Order JO 7210.3EE.) The section further requires the FAA to publish online the most recent completion date for each chart's annual review and to submit annual reports to congressional committees beginning December 31, 2026, summarizing (1) changes to routes, instrument flight rules routes, or visual checkpoints with supporting rationale or safety data; (2) safety risk management documentation per FAA Order JO 8040.4C; (3) consultations with helicopter and fixed-wing operators; and (4) certification of route altitudes, ceilings, and floors ensuring helicopter separation from fixed-wing aircraft per FAA Order 7110.65BB. If a report is late, the Air Traffic Organization chief operating officer must brief the committees in person within four weeks, with FAA outreach beginning within four days.

This section directs the FAA Administrator to initiate, not later than 30 days after enactment, a study on incorporating the lateral locations and published altitudes of helicopter routes into instrument and visual approach and departure procedures for airports to increase fixed-wing operators' situational awareness of nearby helicopter traffic risks. In conducting the study, the Administrator must consult specified stakeholders—including air carriers, helicopter and pilot organizations, general aviation and business aviation representatives, emergency air medical services, non-political Department of Defense and Coast Guard representatives, at least three part 121 airline pilot unions, air traffic controllers' bargaining representatives, and a human factors expert—and consider factors such as chart information spacing and legibility, flight crew workload during critical phases, digital chart layering feasibility, best practices at high-helicopter-traffic airports, and human factors in procedures. Not later than one year after initiating the study, the Administrator must revise (1) Terminal Procedures Publications to chart helicopter routes for fixed-wing awareness and (2) Helicopter Route Charts to include airport approach and departure paths for helicopter awareness; if revisions are made, the Administrator must brief appropriate congressional committees within 60 days.

This section directs the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Administrator, not later than 60 days after enactment, to establish a working group to recommend (1) an objective definition of close proximity encounters (i.e., near midair collisions or losses of separation); (2) parameters to monitor their prevalence and identify traffic conflicts for safety risk management; and (3) public availability of aggregated data on such encounters, including date and location. The working group must consider existing FAA separation rules and safety reporting systems (e.g., Aviation Safety Reporting System, Near Midair Collision System), an NTSB report (AIR-26-02), FAA guidance, foreign practices, and other relevant factors; it comprises appointed members—including 2 NASA experts, 5 aviation labor representatives, at least 5 independent safety experts with 10 years' experience, 6 safety management system administrators from air carriers, part 21 certificate holders, and aerospace, and a nonvoting NTSB representative—advised by up to 5 FAA employees (at least 3 safety experts). Not later than 30 days after receiving the recommendations, the Administrator must publish a report containing them and describing implementation plans.

This section directs the FAA Administrator, not later than 180 days after enactment, to establish a process—consistent with specified FAA orders and advisory circulars on occurrence reporting, accident notification, and collision avoidance—to notify parties involved in near midair collisions, traffic collision avoidance system (TCAS) resolution advisory events, close proximity encounters (as defined in section 122), and other events determined by the Administrator, and to provide deidentified event data to the Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing (ASIAS) program. In establishing the process, the Administrator must (1) create a database to track event details; (2) monitor the database for traffic conflict areas to support safety assurance and risk management; (3) ensure timely notifications while data remains available for analysis or corrective action; (4) consider notifying other frequent operators using deidentified or aggregated data; and (5) assess the practicality of notifications for additional events (e.g., airport surface loss of separation, loss of separation with terrain or obstacles, airborne loss of separation). The Administrator must consult air carriers under parts 121, 135, and 91 of title 14, Code of Federal Regulations; aviation organizations representing helicopter, general, business, experimental, and powered-lift operators; airline pilot and air traffic controller bargaining representatives; FAA safety inspectors; and other experts. Not later than 30 days after establishing the process, the Administrator must brief the appropriate congressional committees, and not later than one year after and annually thereafter, submit reports to those committees on event numbers and locations, average notification times, trends, and mitigation actions. Data collected must be used solely for safety assurance and risk management and remain consistent with voluntary programs such as the Aviation Safety Action Program, Aviation Safety Reporting System, Air Traffic Safety Action Program, and flight operational quality assurance.

This section directs the Inspector General of the Department of Transportation (DOT) to initiate, not later than 30 days after enactment, an audit of the safety culture and safety management system of the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) Air Traffic Organization (ATO) and Aviation Safety Management Organization (ASMO). (As background, the ATO manages air traffic control operations nationwide, and the ASMO oversees aviation safety certification, surveillance, and risk management; the audit must evaluate (1) the effectiveness of their safety management systems, including data sharing at air traffic control facilities; (2) coordination with external stakeholders per FAA regulations; (3) data processes that failed to identify midair collision risks near Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport before January 29, 2025; (4) failures to use external compliance data as indicators of traffic issues there; (5) lapses in annual helicopter route chart reviews per FAA Order JO 7210.3EE; (6) inadequate implementation of post-accident/incident drug and alcohol testing per DOT Order 3910.1D; (7) fears of retaliation for risk reporting; and (8) responses to findings in the FAA's April 2025 National Airspace System Helicopter Operations Helicopter Route Analysis.) The Inspector General must submit a report on the audit to the appropriate congressional committees not later than one year after enactment, including recommendations for the Secretary of Transportation to (A) strengthen safety management system adherence, transparency, data sharing, anti-retaliation protections, open communication, and just culture in the ATO and ASMO; (B) ensure adequate DOT oversight; and (C) any other appropriate actions. Not later than 120 days after the report's submission, the Secretary must respond to recommendations directed at DOT or FAA and submit to the committees a report describing implementation plans.

This section directs the FAA Administrator, not later than one year after the date of enactment, to review and revise procedures for documenting combinations of air traffic control position responsibilities, including each occurrence of such combinations (e.g., a local control position with an operations supervisor or controller-in-charge). In doing so, the Administrator must (1) evaluate existing procedures; (2) examine the feasibility of digitizing or providing an electronic means for the documentation; (3) require operations supervisors to periodically review the documentation and report deviations from standard operating procedures to the facility air traffic manager; (4) consider air traffic facility type and staffing level; and (5) consult with representatives of air traffic controllers (certified under 5 U.S.C. §7111), air traffic control managers and operational supervisors, and aviation safety experts with specific information technology knowledge. The Administrator must brief the appropriate congressional committees not later than one year after completing the review. The section defines "controller-in-charge" (i.e., an air traffic control specialist performing shift supervisor duties per specified FAA orders) and "operations supervisor" (i.e., managerial personnel directly supervising air traffic control operational personnel) and specifies that it does not interfere with collective bargaining agreements under 5 U.S.C. §§7111 or 7106(a).

This section directs the FAA Administrator to (1) complete, not later than 60 days after enactment, a review of miles-in-trail standards and procedures—used by air traffic control to separate aircraft by distance on routes or in airspace—to determine if they ensure appropriate operational safety, considering criteria accuracy, traffic volume and complexity, and National Transportation Safety Board findings; (2) update those standards upon review completion; (3) initiate, not later than 90 days after the initial review, a review of miles-in-trail procedures or agreements at all air traffic control facilities in Class B or Class C airspace, consulting air traffic controllers' representatives, managers, airport sponsors and operators, pilots' representatives, and aviation operators; and (4) submit to congressional committees, not later than 18 months after enactment, a report listing deficient facilities and steps taken or planned to modify their procedures for safety.

This section prohibits helicopter operations on the segment of Helicopter Route 4—as such route existed on January 29, 2025—located between Hains Point and the Woodrow Wilson Memorial Bridge in the District of Columbia and directs that the segment remain eliminated from helicopter charts.

This section establishes chapter 158 of title 10, United States Code, titled "Aviation Safety," concerning Department of Defense (DOD) aircraft operations, with definitions (sec. 2655) and requirements including the following: (1) A memorandum of agreement (sec. 2656) between the Secretary of Transportation and Secretary of Defense, to be entered into and jointly submitted to the appropriate congressional committees (congressional defense committees, House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, and Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation) by September 30, 2026. The agreement must provide for reasonable accommodation and necessary air traffic control services in the national airspace system for fighter aircraft, bomber aircraft, unmanned aircraft systems, and other special mission aircraft not equipped with collision prevention technologies (i.e., those with ADS-B In that provide audible alerts using ADS-B data) or ADS-B Out (or successor technologies); and establish policies governing their operation, proper maintenance, and routine verification practices. (2) Required risk assessment and mitigation for special missions (sec. 2657). (3) A manned rotary wing aviation safety management system consisting of training, policies, and practices (but not onboard equipment) (sec. 2658). (4) Initial and recurring training on highly congested airspace operations (sec. 2659). (5) Flight data monitoring improvements (sec. 2660). (6) Requirements related to barometric altimeters (sec. 2660a), transponder maintenance (sec. 2660b), notifications and reports on certain near-miss events in the National Capital Region (sec. 2660c; i.e., area including the District of Columbia and specified counties in Maryland and Virginia), reports on individuals designated for special mission exclusion purposes (sec. 2660d), and a rule of construction (sec. 2660e).

This section terminates, effective upon submission of the memorandum of agreement required by section 2656 of title 10, U.S. Code (as added by section 201 of this title), to specified congressional committees: (1) section 1046 of the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (Public Law 115-232; 49 U.S.C. 40101 note); and (2) the memorandum of agreement between the Department of Defense and the Federal Aviation Administration entered into on May 10, 2024.

This section directs the Secretary of Defense to submit to the congressional defense committees (1) not later than one year after enactment, a report assessing degradation of radio transmission or reception between Department of Defense (DoD) aircraft and air traffic controllers or other aircraft in the national airspace system, identifying contributing factors, and assessing potential remediation actions; and (2) not later than 90 days after submitting the memorandum required by section 2656 of title 10, U.S. Code (as added by section 201 of this title), a plan to leverage major avionics upgrades or depot-level maintenance associated with collision prevention technology to upgrade communications systems in DoD aircraft, particularly manned rotary-wing aircraft, for improved transmission clarity and reliability. The section defines collision prevention technology and DoD aircraft by reference to section 2655 of title 10, U.S. Code (as added by section 201).

This section directs the Secretary of Defense to submit to Congress, not later than one year after the date of enactment of this Act and annually thereafter for the next two years, a report on the number of Department of Defense proficiency flights that occurred in the National Capital Region during the preceding 12-month period. The National Capital Region has the meaning given the term in section 2655(10) of title 10, United States Code, as added by section 201 of this Act.

This section directs the Secretary of Defense to provide the congressional defense committees with a briefing, not later than 180 days after enactment of this Act, on the feasibility of using virtual constructive training (i.e., simulation-based training with computer-generated forces and environments) to optimize in-air training by the Armed Forces.

This section requires the Secretary of the Army to submit to the House and Senate Armed Services Committees, not later than 60 days after enactment, (1) a copy of the command investigation into the midair collision near Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport on January 29, 2025, with redactions limited to protecting the privacy of the flight crew involved, and (2) an implementation plan for the investigation's recommendations. It further requires the Inspector General of the Army to commence, not later than 120 days after enactment, an assessment of the sufficiency of those recommendations and the implementation plan and to submit a report on the assessment—including any additional recommendations—to the committees not later than six months after enactment.