H.R. 8069 — Strategic Subsea Cables Act of 2026

This section states congressional findings on the growing threat of sabotage to critical undersea infrastructure (i.e., subsea telecommunications cables, natural gas pipelines, and electricity interconnections), citing 10 reported damage incidents from January 2022 to January 2026 in the Baltic Sea, Taiwan Strait, and Trans-Pacific region. It further recognizes protective responses, including NATO's Critical Undersea Infrastructure Network, the EU Action Plan on Cable Security, ASEAN submarine cable resilience guidelines, and the Quad Partnership on Cable Connectivity and Resilience.

This section expresses the sense of Congress that critical undersea infrastructure is vital to U.S. strategic and economic interests—including carrying an estimated $10 trillion in daily transfers, two-thirds of global oil and gas, and 95% of data flows—and has faced increased sabotage risks since Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine, requiring greater U.S. leadership in international bodies (e.g., NATO initiatives, Quad Partnership, International Cable Protection Committee), enhanced resilience and information sharing with allies, and increased government roles alongside private sector responsibilities.

This section directs the Secretary of State, in coordination with the interagency committee, to seek increased U.S. government engagement in international bodies, including the International Cable Protection Committee (ICPC), to advance U.S. national security and economic interests related to critical undersea infrastructure. It further requires the Secretary to submit to the appropriate congressional committees, not later than one year after enactment and annually thereafter for five years, a report describing: (1) how increased U.S. engagement within the ICPC could support U.S. national security objectives related to protecting critical undersea infrastructure; (2) key objectives for promoting and protecting U.S. national security interests within the ICPC; (3) how entities of the People's Republic of China leverage their engagement within the ICPC to further their strategic interests; (4) how encouraging other countries and regional bodies to join the ICPC can better ensure coordinated, consistent global undersea subsea telecommunications infrastructure policies; and (5) other international bodies relevant to critical undersea infrastructure where the U.S. should increase diplomatic engagement.

This section requires the President, in coordination with the Secretary of State and Secretary of the Treasury, to impose sanctions on any foreign person determined on or after enactment to be responsible for or knowingly facilitating sabotage of critical undersea infrastructure (i.e., foreign vessels or entities committing sabotage or providing preparatory support; their owners, operators, insurers, transaction facilitators, port/logistics service providers, document providers, or senior leadership). Sanctions include (1) blocking and prohibiting all transactions in the sanctioned person's property and interests in property in the United States, within U.S. possession or control, or of any U.S. person, using all powers granted under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA); and (2) rendering targeted aliens inadmissible to the United States, ineligible for visas or other entry documentation or benefits under the Immigration and Nationality Act, and subject to immediate visa revocation that automatically cancels any other valid entry documents. Requires the President to submit a report to specified congressional committees within 15 days after imposing sanctions, including a detailed justification. Authorizes implementation using IEEPA authorities (50 U.S.C. 1702, 1704), subjects violators to IEEPA civil and criminal penalties (50 U.S.C. 1705(b)-(c)), and provides exceptions for U.N. Headquarters Agreement compliance, U.S. law enforcement or intelligence activities, and importation of goods.

This section directs the Secretary of State, in coordination with heads of other relevant federal agencies, to submit to the appropriate congressional committees not later than 180 days after enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for five years, an unclassified report (with a possible classified annex) on subsea cable and critical undersea infrastructure activities by the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Russian Federation. The report must cover, for the initial submission the period from January 1, 2022, through enactment and for subsequent submissions the previous calendar year: (1) PRC and Russian subsea cable manufacturing, installation, and maintenance capabilities; (2) an analysis of the Main Directorate of Deep-Sea Research (GUGI) of the Russian Armed Forces, including its operations in seabed warfare and sabotage, use of civilian vessels, sanctions impacts, and a list of suspected vessels; (3) an analysis of the Main Directorate of the General Staff (GRU) of the Russian Armed Forces, including its surveillance and sabotage activities, use of civilian vessels with a list, and sanctions impacts; (4) an analysis of the People's Liberation Army, PRC Coast Guard, China Ship Scientific Research Center, HMN Technologies, and other PRC entities or vessels in surveillance and sabotage, including recent developments and regional activities; (5) an assessment of Russia-PRC cooperation on such activities, including operational coordination, joint research, technology transfers, training, procurement, and sanctions circumvention; (6) a list of documented anomalous vessel behaviors around critical undersea infrastructure by PRC- or Russian-flagged, crewed, or operated vessels, including U.S. responses and allied diplomatic actions; and (7) an assessment of PRC entities' involvement in U.S.-invested subsea cables.

This section directs the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the Secretary of State and heads of other relevant federal agencies, to submit to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and appropriate congressional committees, not later than 180 days after enactment, a report containing the intelligence community's assessment—including dissents from individual agencies—of the likely cause and, if applicable, attribution for the following reported instances of sabotage of critical undersea infrastructure: (1) January 2022 damage to subsea telecommunications infrastructure connecting the Norwegian mainland with Svalbard; (2) September 2022 sabotage of three of four trunklines of the Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2 natural gas pipelines northeast and southeast of Bornholm, Denmark, including assessments of (A) Russian military vessel activities at blast sites beforehand, (B) Russian vessels intercepted or diverted from blast sites afterward, (C) feasibility of sabotage by a small group of divers using the rental boat Andromeda, (D) applicability of Russia's practice of recruiting third-country nationals for land sabotage to maritime contexts, (E) Gazprom's potential fees and penalties for 2021 gas delivery shortfalls, (F) insurance implications based on perpetrator identity, (G) regional law enforcement investigations and outcomes, (H) presence of Russian vessels at other sabotage sites, and (I) attribution information from allies; (3) February 2023 damage to subsea telecommunications infrastructure connecting Taiwan's main island to the Matsu Islands; (4) October 2023 damage to the Finland-to-Estonia Balticconnector natural gas pipeline and subsea telecommunications cables connecting Estonia-Sweden and Finland-Estonia; (5) November 2024 damage to the Finland-to-Germany C-Lion1 and Lithuania-to-Sweden BCS subsea telecommunications cables; (6) December 2024 damage to the Finland-to-Estonia EstLink2 subsea electricity cable and nearby telecommunications cables; (7) January 2025 damage to the Trans-Pacific Express subsea telecommunications cable connecting Taiwan to the United States, South Korea, Japan, and other democracies; (8) February 2025 damage to a subsea telecommunications cable connecting Taiwan's main island to the Penghu Islands; (9) January 2026 damage to subsea telecommunications cables from Latvia's Liepāja to Šventoji; and (10) January 2026 damage to the Finland-to-Estonia Elisa cable involving the vessel Fitburg.

This section expresses the sense of Congress that the United States should enhance diplomatic efforts with allies to improve installation, maintenance, repair, and protection of international critical undersea infrastructure (i.e., subsea cables vital to national security, energy security, and prosperity) amid growing adversary threats. The section directs the Secretary of State to devote sufficient personnel and resources to (1) engaging foreign countries to enhance security and reduce barriers to installation, monitoring, maintenance, and repair of such infrastructure and (2) working with allies and partners to develop a multinational fleet of cable repair ships for rapid sabotage response. The section requires the Secretary to submit to the appropriate congressional committees, not later than 180 days after enactment and annually thereafter for five years, a report on U.S. efforts with allies and partners, including foreign policies or laws creating barriers and progress achieved in the prior calendar year.

This section directs the Secretary of State to assign not fewer than 10 full-time equivalent individuals to support Department of State interagency engagement on critical undersea infrastructure protection—including protection and resilience, coordination with U.S. allies and partners, and U.S. engagement in relevant international bodies—with at least 5 individuals assigned to the Bureau for Cyberspace and Digital Policy to cover subsea telecommunications infrastructure. The section further (1) prohibits the Bureau for Cyberspace and Digital Policy from using dual-hatted current personnel to meet this minimum requirement; (2) requires the Secretary to notify the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the House Committee on Foreign Affairs within 15 days after fulfilling the assignment; and (3) requires the Secretary, within 90 days of enactment, to submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on U.S. government plans to prioritize diplomatic engagement in international bodies to increase information sharing on critical undersea infrastructure sabotage among allied and partner governments and relevant private sector companies.

This section establishes an interagency committee, comprised of heads of appropriate federal agencies and to be created by the President not later than one year after enactment, to lead U.S. government efforts to protect and improve the resilience of subsea telecommunications infrastructure (i.e., undersea cables critical to global data transmission), facilitate related licensing and permitting, and address other related matters as deemed appropriate by the President. The section directs the committee to conduct an overview of federal operational authorities, including (1) an interagency concept of operations for partnering with non-federal entities such as infrastructure owners and operators in crisis scenarios and (2) a review and action plan to streamline licensing, funding, and permitting processes. The section further directs relevant federal agencies to develop strategies, in coordination with the committee and industry stakeholders, to analyze subsea infrastructure sabotage—including identifying trends, refining attributions of malicious damage, high-risk areas, federal functions, and mitigation efforts—with strategy elements covering resourcing, coordination with allies and partners, and technical expertise for attributions. Finally, the section requires the President to submit a report to Congress not later than 30 days after establishing the committee, detailing staffing resources needed and a plan to advance the committee's objectives.

This section directs appropriate federal agencies, consistent with protections for classified information, intelligence sources, privacy, and civil liberties, to issue procedures—approved by the interagency committee and coordinated with trusted allies as appropriate—for timely information sharing with cleared non-federal entities on subsea telecommunications infrastructure sabotage or potential sabotage, including classified, declassified, unclassified, and controlled unclassified information; sharing to prevent or mitigate adverse effects; and timely release of funds to meet cost, schedule, and performance metrics. The procedures must (1) enable the interagency committee to identify and share sabotage information in real time; (2) incorporate existing processes and information-sharing entities; and (3) require security controls against unauthorized access. The Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the interagency committee, must submit the procedures to Congress within 60 days of enactment and annual reports on implementation for five years beginning one year after submission.