H.R. 8177 — Critical Undersea Infrastructure Resilience Initiative Act

This section states congressional findings concerning the People's Republic of China's (PRC) gray zone tactics to undermine Taiwan's security, including suspected sabotage of undersea cables around Taiwan in incidents such as the 2023 severing of cables to the Matsu Islands (affecting 13,000 residents for 50 days), damage to a cable north of Taipei in January 2025 by PRC-registered vessels, and at least 11 similar cases since 2023 potentially involving PRC and Russian actors. The findings highlight Taiwan's vulnerability to disruptions of critical undersea infrastructure—which could cripple military, economic, and social functions given Taiwan's role as the world's 21st largest economy by purchasing power parity and its integration in global information and communications technology supply chains—and urge the United States and allies to bolster Taiwan's defenses and international cooperation.

This section defines, for purposes of the Act, (1) "critical undersea infrastructure" as subsea energy infrastructure—including subsea cables, pipelines, or equipment on, beneath, or within the seabed to transmit electricity or transport natural gas, oil, or hydrogen between land-based or offshore infrastructure—or subsea telecommunications infrastructure—including subsea fiber-optic cables and related equipment to transmit communications, data, voice, video, or other electronic signals—along with associated landing stations and facilities; and (2) "sabotage" as actions or preparations intended to cause defective production of, operation of, or damage to critical undersea infrastructure, including the integrity of data transmitted via subsea telecommunications infrastructure.

This section establishes the Taiwan Critical Undersea Infrastructure Initiative, to be led by the Secretary of State in coordination with the Secretaries of Defense and Homeland Security, the Commandant of the Coast Guard, and other relevant agency heads not later than 360 days after enactment of this Act. The Initiative prioritizes protection and resilience of critical undersea infrastructure (i.e., undersea cables vital for communications and data) near Taiwan against threats from the People's Republic of China through five key focus areas: (1) developing and deploying advanced real-time monitoring and detection systems, including early warnings to Taiwan; (2) establishing rapid response protocols with regional partners and authorizing $20 million annually for FY2027 through FY2032 to build logistical capacity to minimize downtime from disruptions; (3) enhancing maritime domain awareness via Navy and Coast Guard efforts with Taiwan and regional partners, including joint patrols in the Taiwan Strait; (4) creating international cooperative frameworks for joint drills, intelligence-sharing, and surveillance; and (5) supporting hardening of Taiwan's undersea cables through reinforcement, deeper burial, and resilient materials.

This section directs the President to work with like-minded international partners (1) to implement strategies countering the People's Republic of China's (PRC) critical undersea infrastructure sabotage activities as part of its gray zone warfare, including by increasing diplomatic pressure on the PRC to adhere to international norms for protecting such infrastructure; and (2) to raise global awareness of risks from the PRC's sabotage of critical undersea infrastructure through public diplomacy efforts, information sharing, and participation in international forums addressing gray zone tactics and infrastructure protection.

This section requires the President, in coordination with the Secretaries of State and the Treasury, to impose blocking sanctions under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) and visa ineligibility (including revocation) on any foreign person determined on or after enactment to be responsible for or facilitating sabotage of undersea infrastructure critical to the security of Taiwan or other U.S. allies or partners. Targeted persons include (1) any foreign vessel or entity whose owner or operator knowingly commits sabotage or provides preparatory support (e.g., surveillance, logistics) and (2) any foreign person who knowingly owns, operates, or manages such a vessel or entity; provides insurance or underwriting; facilitates deceptive transactions; offers port, logistics, or flagging services to evade sanctions; or serves as a captain or senior leader. The President must report to appropriate congressional committees within 15 days justifying the sanctions; may implement via specified IEEPA authorities (50 U.S.C. 1702, 1704) with penalties under IEEPA section 206 (50 U.S.C. 1705); and provides exceptions for UN Headquarters compliance, U.S. law enforcement or intelligence activities, and goods importation, plus a national security waiver requiring congressional certification and report.

This section directs the President to submit semiannual reports to Congress, beginning not later than 180 days after enactment and every 180 days thereafter through 2032, detailing (1) any incidents of interference or sabotage related to critical undersea infrastructure near Taiwan and (2) any actions taken in response to such incidents.

This section states U.S. policy to prepare for potential crises involving Taiwan—including a People's Republic of China attempt to change the status quo by force—through comprehensive interagency contingency planning and directs the President to establish, not later than 90 days after enactment, a Cross-Strait Contingency Planning Group chaired by the National Security Council and including senior officials from the Departments of State and Defense, the intelligence community, and other appropriate agencies. The group must (1) conduct scenario-based planning exercises for crises such as blockades, island seizures, military contingencies, economic coercion, cyberattacks, and hybrid threats; (2) identify vulnerabilities in U.S. and allied supply chains, financial systems, infrastructure, and security; (3) develop integrated diplomatic, military, economic, cyber, and homeland security contingency plans; (4) assess existing authorities, resources, and decision processes; (5) identify gaps and recommend solutions; (6) share risk assessments with allies and partners; and (7) test and refine plans. Not later than 180 days after the group's establishment, and annually thereafter for 10 years, the group shall submit to Congress a classified report describing assessed scenarios and planning activities, U.S. and allied preparedness (including gaps and resource needs), legislative and policy recommendations, and exercises conducted with lessons learned.