“A bill to establish the William S. Knudsen Commission for American Defense-Industrial Mobilization, and for other purposes.”
No CRS summary available for this bill.
This section states congressional findings on the inadequate U.S. domestic defense industrial capacity, munitions and materiel shortages requiring years to replenish, regulatory barriers to production and expansion, associated national security threats amid global conflicts, and a historical parallel to pre-World War II mobilization led by automotive executive William S. Knudsen.
This section establishes in the legislative branch the William S. Knudsen Commission for American Defense-Industrial Mobilization to examine and make recommendations to the President and Congress on the U.S. defense-industrial base. The commission comprises 12 members appointed as follows: one each by the Senate majority leader, Senate minority leader, House Speaker, and House minority leader; two each by the chair and ranking minority member of the Senate Armed Services Committee and the House Armed Services Committee. Members must be U.S. citizens with significant expertise in manufacturing, defense procurement, defense technology and innovation, or industrial policy; all appointments must occur within 45 days of enactment (with unmade appointments reducing the commission size); the committee chairs jointly designate the chair and the ranking minority members designate the vice chair; the commission holds its initial meeting once two-thirds of members are appointed, meets subsequently upon the chair's or a majority's call, and requires a quorum of eight members; members serve for the commission's life, with vacancies filled by the original appointor (except for missed initial deadlines); and a member may be removed for cause by their original appointor with three-fourths commission approval. The commission must (1) review the defense-industrial base, including production requirements for major war across multiple theaters; (2) assess lessons from the Ukraine war (with a classified annex on operational plans for Europe, Middle East, and Asia contingencies), expected production needs across war scenarios, minimum/optimal production and stocks for key weapons and munitions, current industrial capacity and supply chain issues, relevant federal policies and programs, and regulatory burdens from specified agencies; and (3) recommend reforms to operational planning, defense procurement, and related matters.