S. 2342 — Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026

This section specifies the amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 101 for intelligence activities of the federal government as those detailed in the classified Schedule of Authorizations prepared to accompany this Act. The section requires the classified schedule to be made available to the Senate and House Appropriations Committees and the President, with suitable distribution within the executive branch. The section prohibits public disclosure of the classified schedule or portions thereof except (1) as provided in 50 U.S.C. 3306(a) (i.e., public disclosure of the aggregate National Intelligence Program budget request); (2) to the extent necessary to implement the budget; or (3) as otherwise required by law. (Thus, detailed line-item authorizations for the National Intelligence Program remain classified.)

This section authorizes increases in appropriations provided by the Act for federal employee salaries, pay, retirement, and other benefits as necessary for such compensation or benefits increases authorized by law.

This section prohibits transfers or reprogramming of funds authorized by the Act or otherwise made available for the National Intelligence Program (NIP)—defined by reference to section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003)—for FY2026 until such funds have been made available under the NIP for purposes of section 102A(d) of that Act (50 U.S.C. 3024(d)), and limits any such actions to those authorized by that section.

This section establishes a new criminal offense under the National Security Act of 1947 for unauthorized entry onto property within U.S. jurisdiction that is under the control of an intelligence community element and clearly marked as closed or restricted. Violations are punishable by (1) for a first offense, a fine under 18 U.S.C., imprisonment for not more than 180 days, or both; (2) for a second offense, a fine under such title, imprisonment for not more than 3 years, or both; and (3) for a third or subsequent offense, a fine under such title, imprisonment for not more than 10 years, or both.

This section establishes protections for certain Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) facilities and assets from unmanned aircraft and unmanned aircraft systems under a new section 15A of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949. It defines key terms—including "covered facility or asset" (i.e., CIA-owned, leased, or controlled property, plus specified adjacent Federal Highway Administration and Office of the Director of National Intelligence properties, that are deemed high-risk via a risk-based assessment coordinated with the Department of Transportation, located beneath prohibited or restricted Federal Aviation Administration airspace, notified to Congress, and related to CIA functions authorized under the National Security Act of 1947)—and cross-references definitions for "electronic communication," "intercept," "oral communication," and "wire communication" in 18 U.S.C. §2510. The section authorizes the CIA Director to take, and direct agency personnel to take, actions described in subsection (c)(1) to mitigate credible unmanned aircraft threats to covered facilities or assets and actions described in subsection (c)(3), notwithstanding 49 U.S.C. §46502 (aircraft piracy) or 18 U.S.C. §§32 (aircraft destruction), 1030 (computer fraud), 1367 (interference with air navigation), and chapters 119 (wiretap) and 206 (pen/trap and trace devices). (Thus, such actions may include signal disruption or interception without violating those statutes.)

This section modifies intelligence community acquisition authorities as follows: (1) revises limitations on other transaction authority—under which heads of intelligence community elements may enter into transactions and agreements (other than contracts, cooperative agreements, or grants) for basic, applied, and advanced research projects and prototype projects—to allow the National Security Agency or National Reconnaissance Office to enter into such transactions up to $500 million (with notice to the congressional intelligence committees at least 14 days prior for amounts exceeding $100 million) and other intelligence community elements up to $100 million; (2) authorizes heads of intelligence community elements to enter into follow-on production contracts or transactions using any authority provided by law; and (3) authorizes the Director of National Intelligence to determine that the term "major system" excludes a software program.

This section directs the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security, not later than 180 days after the date of enactment, to develop—with input from the military departments, combatant commands, and joint commands—two strategies for Department of Defense use of the Distributed Common Ground System (DCGS, i.e., the primary intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance processing, exploitation, and dissemination system) or any successor system to enhance jointness during its modernization: (1) one covering the two-year period beginning 180 days after enactment; and (2) one covering a long-term period. The strategies must address (A) new requirements to be satisfied; (B) planned investments or divestments; (C) justification for any military department plan to replace service-managed components, including description of processing, exploitation, and dissemination enhancements; and (D) explanation of how proposed architectural changes improve functionality or interoperability; and to submit the strategies to the congressional intelligence committees, Senate and House Armed Services Committees, and Senate and House Appropriations Defense Subcommittees.

This section requires the heads of specified elements of the intelligence community—including the National Security Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, intelligence elements of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, Space Force, and Coast Guard, the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Directorate of Intelligence, the Department of Energy's Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, the Department of State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, the Department of Homeland Security's Office of Intelligence and Analysis, and the Department of the Treasury's Office of Intelligence and Analysis—to conduct not less frequently than annually a survey of analytic objectivity among officers and employees involved in producing intelligence products and to submit a report on the findings to the congressional intelligence committees. Each survey must cover (1) perceptions of bias or politicization affecting the intelligence cycle, (2) types of intelligence products perceived as most prone to objectivity concerns, and (3) whether identified concerns were raised with an analytic ombudsman or appropriate entity.

This section amends Section 6312 of the James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (50 U.S.C. 3364 note) by (1) revising subsection (b) to require that training pursuant to the policy on analytic standards be a dedicated, stand-alone training that includes instruction on avoiding political bias; and (2) expanding the annual report required under subsection (d)(1) to include, in addition to the number and themes of relevant incidents, a list of each intelligence product reported during the preceding one-year period to the Analytic Ombudsman of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.

This section directs the Director of National Intelligence to submit to the congressional intelligence committees, not later than 180 days after enactment of this Act, an estimate of post-enactment federal obligations to ensure all intelligence community sensitive compartmented information facilities (SCIFs) comply with Intelligence Community Directive 705 (ICD 705). The estimate must be disaggregated by intelligence community element, include an implementation plan, and identify any necessary administrative or legislative actions.

This section revises the appointment of the Director of the Department of Energy's Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence—which is under the National Intelligence Program; reports to the Secretary; and is responsible for intelligence and counterintelligence policy and for counterintelligence training plans for personnel handling classified military technology and dual-use commercial technology—to require appointment by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate (previously, selected by the Secretary from qualified individuals), establishes a six-year term with eligibility for reappointment (previously, no specified term), and specifies qualifications, effective January 21, 2029.

This section revises 31 U.S.C. 311 to rename the Office of Intelligence and Analysis (currently responsible for foreign intelligence and counterintelligence related to Treasury operations) as the Office of Economic Intelligence and Security and expands its responsibilities to (1) analyze foreign intelligence and counterintelligence relating to Treasury operations and other federal agencies' economic statecraft tools excluding intelligence community elements; (2) provide intelligence support and economic analysis to federal agencies implementing U.S. economic policy, including for global strategic competition; and (3) perform other duties assigned by the Treasury Secretary in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence. The section retitles the heading position as Assistant Secretary for Economic Intelligence and Security (still appointed by the President with Senate confirmation and reporting to the Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Crimes), makes conforming amendments to the National Security Act of 1947 and the table of sections for chapter 3 of title 31, and deems prior references to the prior office name as references to the new office. Subsection (a) takes effect 180 days after the Treasury Secretary submits to the appropriate congressional committees (i.e., intelligence, banking/financial services, and appropriations committees) a 3-year strategic plan detailing required resources, including staffing, administrative expenses, structural changes, and implementation needs for the Department. This section also prohibits transferring or reprogramming funds appropriated before enactment from the Office of Foreign Assets Control, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, Office of International Affairs, Office of Tax Policy, or Office of Domestic Finance to support the new office.

This section directs the head of the Office of Counterintelligence in the Department of the Treasury's Office of Intelligence and Analysis to implement policies and procedures ensuring counterintelligence support (1) to all Treasury entities responsible for safeguarding networks and systems and (2) for coordination between counterintelligence threat mitigation activities and cyber network and system defense efforts. The section further requires submission of a report to the congressional intelligence committees on the status of such implementation not later than 270 days after the date of enactment.

This section requires the Director of National Intelligence to submit to the congressional intelligence committees (1) a report, due not later than 30 days after enactment, on personnel matters of the Director's Initiatives Group—including hiring processes, a list of personnel with responsibilities since the group's creation, funding sources, and security clearances granted with associated processes; and (2) notice of intent at least 30 days prior to any action affecting resources of the National Intelligence Program (NIP). (The NIP funds intelligence community activities, as defined in 50 U.S.C. 3003.)

This section prohibits the Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)—an element of the intelligence community responsible for homeland security intelligence analysis and collection—from using funds authorized by this Act to conduct covered activities under its Field Intelligence Program (i.e., the program established by I&A Policy Instruction 907, issued June 29, 2016, and renamed December 24, 2024) or Open Source Intelligence Collection Program (i.e., the program established by I&A Policy Instruction 900, issued January 13, 2015, or successor). Covered activities include (1) interviews for intelligence collection with criminally charged, arraigned, or custodied individuals (Federal, state, or local) prior to guilt adjudication, absent interviewee consent following counsel consultation; (2) collection targeting journalists performing journalistic functions; and (3) interviews with U.S. persons absent a reasonable belief, based on facts and circumstances, that the individual possesses significant foreign intelligence (as defined in 50 U.S.C. 3003). The section further limits use of such funds to increase, above pre-enactment levels of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 (division G, Public Law 118-31), the number of I&A Open Source Intelligence Division personnel assigned exclusively or predominantly to domestic terrorism issues. Rules of construction clarify that the prohibitions do not limit DHS oversight of I&A activities or I&A's authority to share or receive intelligence with foreign, state, local, Tribal, or territorial governments; the private sector; or other Federal elements, including DHS components.

This section establishes a special rule under the Higher Education Act of 1965 providing that, for officers or employees of an intelligence community element (as defined in 50 U.S.C. 3003), the term "permanent duty station" excludes any such station within 50 miles of the element's headquarters facility. (Thus, such personnel—and their spouses or dependent children—stationed near their agency's headquarters, typically in the Washington, DC, area, do not qualify for in-state tuition rates at public institutions of higher education in those states based solely on that duty station.)

This section directs the CIA Director to complete, not less frequently than once every 365 days, an anonymous Agency climate assessment focused on preventing and responding to sexual assault and sexual harassment, examining its prevalence in the workforce, and soliciting employee opinions on the Agency's response to related allegations and complaints and the effectiveness of that response. The section further requires submission of the assessment findings to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and House Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense.

This section defines "commercially available information," "personally identifiable information," "sensitive activities," "sensitive commercially available information" (i.e., commercially available information reasonably expected to contain a substantial volume of personally identifiable information on U.S. persons or more than de minimis sensitive data, excluding public records and limited data samples), "sensitive data," and "United States person" and directs the head of each intelligence community element to submit to the congressional intelligence committees, not later than 60 days after enactment and annually thereafter, a report on the element's access to, collection, processing, and use of sensitive commercially available information. For each such dataset used for purposes other than research and development, the report includes (1) a description of the nature and volume of the information; (2) the mission or administrative need and dataset characteristics required; (3) the purpose and intended use; (4) the legal authority; (5) the source and persons from whom obtained; (6) the mechanics of access, collection, and processing, including participating entities; (7) methods to limit access, collection, and processing consistent with the need; and (8) an assessment of whether the need can be met using privacy-enhancing techniques such as filtering or anonymization.

This section requires the Director of National Intelligence, not later than 90 days after enactment, to submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on secure mobile communications systems available to employees and officers of the intelligence community (IC), disaggregated by IC element. The report must include (1) the number of users by system, element, and employee/officer level; (2) estimated expenditures to develop and maintain the systems, disaggregated by system, element, year, and number of devices; (3) capabilities and classification levels of each system; (4) the developing and maintaining IC element for each system and any inter-element service agreements; and (5) any systems in development, including their capabilities, progress, and estimated deployment timelines. The report is submitted in unclassified form but may include a classified annex.

This section directs the Director of National Intelligence to develop and submit to the congressional intelligence committees, not later than 180 days after the date of enactment, a plan for an integrated tracking system spanning the intelligence community for accrediting sensitive compartmented information facilities (SCIFs)—secure spaces for handling top-secret intelligence with special access controls—to increase transparency, track accreditation status, and minimize duplication of effort. The plan must include (1) an estimated implementation cost; (2) a description of how applicants and cleared industry partners can monitor SCIF accreditation status; (3) guidelines to reduce duplication across the intelligence community and Department of Defense; (4) a mechanism to track compliance with Intelligence Community Directive 705 (or successor directive) on SCIFs; (5) proposed measures to enhance security against adversary threats; and (6) a list of necessary administrative and legislative actions.

This section requires the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the FBI Director, to submit to specified congressional committees within 90 days of enactment an assessment of counterintelligence vulnerabilities at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), including risks to its security practices and facilities from nation-state and non-nation-state actors seeking U.S. space technology; threats from Russian nationals at Johnson Space Center; recommendations to mitigate identified gaps; a description and evaluation of NASA's responses to illicit satellite acquisitions, as previously reported under section 1261 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 (NDAA); with NASA required to cooperate fully (assessment in unclassified form, if possible, with classified annex). This section extends DNI annual reports under that NDAA section 1261—on efforts by state sponsors of terrorism, foreign countries, and entities to illicitly acquire U.S. satellites and related items—until December 31, 2026 (previously indefinite thereafter). This section further requires the FBI Counterintelligence Division, in coordination with its Office of Private Sector, to assess counterintelligence risks to federally licensed commercial spaceports within 60 days of enactment and distribute the assessment (at the lowest classification level possible, with classified annexes if needed) to relevant FBI field offices, spaceport leadership, and congressional intelligence committees.

This section establishes a Chaplain Corps in the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) for spiritual and religious pastoral services, headed by a Chief of Chaplains appointed by and reporting directly to the CIA Director. Chaplains must be located at CIA headquarters and in each region of the agency's overseas regional mission centers, with authority to travel as needed; must be full-time CIA employees (not contractors) serving exclusively in that role (not as collateral duty); and must be appointed with basic pay not exceeding the maximum rate for GS-15 of the General Schedule. The chaplain-to-personnel ratio must equal, to the extent practicable, that of the Armed Forces; chaplains must have prior chaplaincy experience and maintain national board certification; the CIA Director must reimburse travel, provide security clearances and workspaces (with privacy standards), and protect chaplains from required rites contrary to their beliefs; and the Director must certify annually to Congress that chaplains remain certified.

This section directs the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community and the Inspector General of the Department of Defense to jointly review processes, oversight, and management of special access programs (SAPs, i.e., highly classified DoD programs) and controlled access programs (CAPs, i.e., analogous IC programs with access restrictions beyond standard clearances) in the Department of Defense and Office of the Director of National Intelligence, regardless of funding source. The review must assess (1) creation and maintenance processes, (2) oversight and management reforms, (3) policies ensuring appropriate access while preventing unnecessary access, (4) improvements to integration and information sharing across compartmented systems, (5) oversight challenges, and (6) other relevant matters. Not later than 180 days after enactment, the Inspectors General must brief the congressional intelligence committees and Senate and House Armed Services Committees on preliminary findings and submit a report on results; the Secretary of Defense and Director of National Intelligence must provide timely access to necessary documents and information.

This section prohibits contractors and subcontractors of intelligence community (IC) elements from, during the term of an IC contract, (1) collecting, retaining, or knowingly or recklessly facilitating the collection or retention of location data from cellular-enabled or cellular-connected devices (e.g., phones, wearable fitness trackers) in covered locations except as necessary for contracted services, or (2) selling, monetizing, or knowingly or recklessly facilitating the sale of such data to non-IC entities, where covered locations are those specified in 28 CFR 202.222(a)(1) or successor regulations. It further requires each IC element head to obtain certifications of compliance with the prohibition from relevant contractors and subcontractors not later than 60 days after enactment. The section treats the veracity of such certifications as material for purposes of the False Claims Act (31 USC 3729). (Thus, a false certification may result in civil liability to the United States, including penalties of not less than $5,000 and not more than $10,000, as adjusted for inflation, plus three times the government's damages.)

This section consolidates intelligence community reporting requirements on unidentified anomalous phenomena by (1) revising subsection (a) of Section 413 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 to require elements to make relevant data available immediately to the All-domain Anomaly Resolution Office (AARO) in a manner protecting intelligence sources and methods; (2) striking subsections (b) and (c); and (3) striking the subsection designation "(a)"; and (b) updating the section heading to "All-domain Anomaly Resolution Office" (from "Unidentified Aerial Phenomena Task Force"). (AARO, established under 50 U.S.C. 3373, synchronizes Department of Defense and intelligence community efforts to collect, report, and analyze incidents of unidentified anomalous phenomena, including adverse physiological effects.)

This section directs the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and in consultation with relevant intelligence community elements, to (1) brief the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System on foreign threats to the Federal Reserve System and (2) work with the Chair of the Board to create and implement standardized security and classification measures for protecting information collected, generated, and stored by the Federal Reserve System. It requires the Director of National Intelligence, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Chair to jointly submit to the appropriate congressional committees—defined as the congressional intelligence committees, the Senate Committees on the Judiciary and Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, and the House Committees on the Judiciary and Financial Services—a report detailing the status of implementing those measures not later than 180 days after enactment.

This section requires the Directors of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) and National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, to jointly develop and submit to the congressional intelligence committees and the Senate and House Armed Services Committees, not later than 90 days after enactment, a plan to establish a co-located joint program management office for commercial geospatial intelligence data and services (i.e., satellite imagery and related services procured from private-sector providers). The office is to be headed by an NGA representative and deputized by an NRO representative, and the plan must include (1) implementation milestones and (2) an updated acquisition strategy to gain efficiencies from coordinated purchases.

This section directs the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community to submit to the congressional intelligence committees, not later than 120 days after enactment, a review of the adequacy of policies and procedures governing the intelligence community's use of commercial messaging applications. The review must assess compliance with the Federal Records Act of 1950 (i.e., chapter 31 of title 44, U.S. Code) and be submitted in unclassified form, with a possible classified annex.

This section establishes authority for the Director of the National Security Agency to correlate and evaluate intelligence related to national security and disseminate such intelligence to appropriate legislative and executive branch customers.

This section directs the Director of the National Security Agency (NSA), within 120 days of enactment, to develop and submit to intelligence community (IC) elements standard contractual clauses for network security in procurements from covered providers (i.e., U.S.-incorporated entities providing telecommunications equipment, systems, or services to the IC). The clauses require (1) timely security updates for network devices (i.e., hubs, routers, gateways, firewalls, switches); (2) timely decommissioning of devices no longer receiving original equipment manufacturer updates; (3) configuration management practices (i.e., baseline configurations and plans aligned with security policies and industry best practices); (4) multi-factor authentication or equivalent for high-risk systems; (5) annual threat hunting (i.e., proactive detection of compromises beyond automated systems) per Director criteria; and (6) notification to the IC Chief Information Officer of novel compromises implicating sophisticated adversaries. This section prohibits IC elements from procuring or extending contracts for such telecommunications without the required clauses, subject to case-by-case waivers if inclusion would impede authorized intelligence activities. This section further directs the NSA Director, in coordination with the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), to (1) designate covered provider systems as high-risk within 270 days of enactment if unauthorized access could compromise lawful intercept or intelligence systems, customer proprietary network information, administrative functions, or core network services; (2) publish minimum threat hunting criteria within 90 days of enactment; and (3) conduct biennial reviews of high-risk designations.

This section establishes in the Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) of the Department of Homeland Security a prohibition on collecting information or intelligence targeting any United States person (i.e., a U.S. citizen, alien known by I&A to be a permanent resident alien, unincorporated association substantially composed of such persons, or corporation incorporated in the United States except one directed and controlled by foreign governments). It specifies that this prohibition does not limit I&A personnel from sharing or receiving intelligence or information with or from state, local, tribal, or territorial governments, the private sector, or other federal government elements (including DHS components).

This section adds a new section 517 to Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.) requiring the head of each intelligence community element, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, to develop and maintain procedures for responding to unmasking requests (i.e., requests to disclose masked United States person identifying information in disseminated intelligence reports). The procedures must ensure, at a minimum: (1) each written request identifies the report, submission date, requester and recipient details, and a fact-based justification; (2) approval only by the element head or specifically delegated officers, with originating element concurrence if applicable; (3) retention of all request records for at least 10 years, including approver name and justification for approved requests; (4) an exception for exigent circumstances or imminent intelligence loss, followed by a prompt written request; (5) during the presidential transition period (from a general election to inauguration), additional documentation on transition team members, general counsel concurrence for such requests, and notification to specified congressional leaders within 14 days of approval; and (6) submission of documentation to congressional intelligence committees within 14 days for approved requests concerning federal nominees or officeholders, presidential transition team members, or Supreme Court Justices. This section further requires annual reports, due by March 1, from each intelligence community element to the congressional intelligence committees documenting the prior year's total unmasking requests received, approved, and denied, disaggregated by requesting entity.

This section prohibits the use of National Intelligence Program funds for any covered practice in the intelligence community (i.e., any practice that discriminates for or against any person in a manner prohibited by the Constitution, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, or any other federal law). It directs the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the head of each intelligence community element, to revise all relevant regulations, policies, procedures, manuals, circulars, courses, training, and guidance for compliance with this prohibition not later than 90 days after enactment.

This section establishes an annual reporting requirement under Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 for the FBI Director to submit to the congressional intelligence committees, not later than 30 days after enactment and annually thereafter, unclassified data (with a possible classified annex) on FBI cases from the preceding fiscal year. Each report includes the number of active cases, unique cases, and cases opened for each of the following: (1) Russia counterintelligence cases; (2) China counterintelligence cases; (3) espionage or leak cases; (4) all other counterintelligence cases; (5) ISIS counterterrorism cases; (6) Hizballah counterterrorism cases; (7) cartel and other transnational criminal organization counterterrorism cases; (8) all other international counterterrorism cases; (9) Russia cyber national security cases; (10) China cyber national security cases; and (11) all other cyber national security cases.

This section modifies authorities of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) under section 102A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3024) by (1) repealing requirements for semi-annual reports on implementation, personnel transfers to national intelligence centers, authority to establish such centers, and enhanced personnel management; (2) revising tasking and personnel policies to replace "consultation" with "coordination," expand recruitment, retention, and training to emphasize diversity, limit policies to those on behalf of the DNI, and shift from "conduct" or "carry out" to "direct" or "direct independent" for accountability reviews, compliance audits, and counterintelligence evaluations; (3) authorizing delegation of DNI reviews and investigations of proposed investments into the United States; (4) requiring the DNI, in coordination with IC element heads, to submit to the congressional intelligence committees—not later than 180 days after enactment—a plan reforming IC acquisition processes to expedite acquisitions and prefer commercial solutions consistent with 10 U.S.C. §3453 (requiring, to the maximum extent practicable, procurement specifications enabling use of commercial products or services, or nondevelopmental items, with agency policies favoring such acquisitions, prime/subcontractor incorporation, and personnel training); such plan must itemize major planned or pending IC acquisitions; and (5) making conforming amendments, including subsection redesignations and updated cross-references in the National Security Act and related laws.

This section requires the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) to submit to the congressional intelligence committees, not later than 90 days after enactment, a plan to reduce the staff of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI)—which coordinates the 18 elements of the U.S. intelligence community—to the maximum number of full-time equivalent employees, detailees, and contractors required for optimized execution of the DNI's statutory authorities, while ensuring opportunities for alternative U.S. government employment, details, or assignments and no involuntary terminations. The section further directs the DNI to initiate the staff reduction process at least 90 days after plan submission or one year after enactment (whichever is later), upon certification of employee protections (with exceptions for terminations based on documented security, counterintelligence, or misconduct issues or performance deficiencies over at least 180 days); requires written updates every 60 days thereafter identifying reduced positions until the target is met; and permits return of detailees to home agencies 45 days after plan submission. In addition, the section amends the statutory provision on ODNI location to require facilities necessary to carry out the office's core intelligence mission.

This section redesignates the Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence as Deputy Director of National Intelligence, strikes "Principal" from all relevant statutory references (including in the National Security Act of 1947 and specified authorization acts), and provides that any legal reference to the Principal Deputy Director is treated as a reference to the Deputy Director. This section eliminates authority for the Director of National Intelligence to appoint up to four Deputy Directors of National Intelligence and instead establishes two Assistant Directors of National Intelligence—one for Mission Integration and one for Policy and Capabilities—appointed by the Director; makes conforming changes to related statutory provisions; and updates the section heading and table of contents for section 103A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3026).

This section revises the duties of the National Intelligence Council (NIC)—which produces national intelligence estimates (NIEs) for U.S. policymakers and assists the Director of National Intelligence (DNI)—by (1) authorizing the NIC to produce or coordinate the production of NIEs (previously, produce only), and (2) limiting its evaluation role to community-wide collection and production of intelligence (previously, including requirements and resources thereof). This section also conditions the DNI's provision of staff to the NIC on section 103(d)(1) (previously, unconditional).

This section transfers the National Counterintelligence and Security Center (NCSC)—which coordinates counterintelligence efforts across the intelligence community—from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) to the Counterintelligence Division of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), including appropriate staff and resources, with initiation no earlier than 90 days after submission of a joint transfer plan or one year after enactment (whichever is later) and completion no later than two years after enactment. It also transfers appropriate duties of the NCSC Director to the FBI Assistant Director for Counterintelligence; requires the joint plan and quarterly implementation reports to congressional intelligence committees through completion; directs staff reductions to comply with section 403(b); repeals the NCSC's establishing provision (50 U.S.C. 3031); makes conforming amendments to the Counterintelligence Enhancement Act of 2002 (50 U.S.C. 3382 et seq.) to designate the FBI Assistant Director for Counterintelligence (or designee) as NCSC head under FBI authority; and strikes the NCSC Director from the list of positions at Level IV of the Executive Schedule (5 U.S.C. 5315).

This section redesignates the National Counterterrorism Center as the National Counterterrorism and Counternarcotics Center in the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3056) and makes conforming amendments in the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 101 et seq.), Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (Pub. L. 108-458), and specified National Defense Authorization Acts. It further revises the center's limitation on domestic activities (50 U.S.C. 3056(e)) to authorize receipt and retention of intelligence pertaining to domestic terrorism (as defined in 18 U.S.C. 2331)—activities involving acts dangerous to human life that violate U.S. or state criminal laws, appear intended to intimidate civilians or coerce government policy, and occur primarily within U.S. jurisdiction—to enable collection, retention, and dissemination of international terrorism intelligence. The amendments take effect 30 days after enactment, after which statutory references to the prior name are treated as references to the new name.

This section directs the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to jointly submit to the congressional intelligence committees, within 90 days of enactment, a plan to transfer the National Counterproliferation and Biosecurity Center (NCBC)—which coordinates intelligence community efforts to counter proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and biosecurity threats—to the CIA, including the duties and responsibilities of the NCBC Director. The section requires the DNI to initiate the transfers, in coordination with the CIA Director, at least 90 days after plan submission or one year after enactment (whichever is later), and to complete them within 455 days of enactment; requires quarterly status reports to the congressional intelligence committees until 455 days after enactment; and mandates that any NCBC staff reductions comply with section 403(b). The section makes conforming amendments to the National Security Act of 1947 by (1) striking the provision designating the NCBC Director as an ODNI officer, (2) designating the CIA Director (or designee) as NCBC head and the CIA as its organizational home, and (3) striking the national security waiver authority, annual report requirement, and sense of Congress provisions related to the NCBC; sets an effective date of 455 days after enactment for these amendments; and provides that statutory references to the NCBC Director become references to the CIA Director (or designee) thereafter. A rule of construction permits the DNI to retain certain NCBC coordinating functions at the Office of the DNI, transfer other missions or functions elsewhere, or terminate them.

This section replaces the authority to establish national intelligence centers—with primary responsibility for all-source analysis, intelligence requirements, and other duties in assigned areas of responsibility, including separate budget line items—with authority to convene temporary national intelligence task forces to address intelligence priorities. A task force (1) may be comprised of select employees from intelligence community elements other than the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, (2) convenes at that office for a limited time in support of a specific intelligence matter, and (3) must be dissolved not later than 540 days after conclusion of that support (or responsibility transferred to a specific intelligence community element if the matter exceeds 540 days). Participating employees continue to receive compensation from their employing agencies. If a task force operates more than 60 days, the Director of National Intelligence must notify the congressional intelligence committees of its personnel numbers and employing elements, the specific intelligence matter, and approximate dissolution date.

This section repeals statutory authority for, and directs termination of, three intelligence community entities. (1) Intelligence Community Chief Data Officer.—Repeals section 103K of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3034b), which established the position, with conforming amendments to section 103G and clerical amendment to the Act's table of contents. (2) Intelligence Community Innovation Unit.—Directs the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) to terminate operations before 90 days after enactment and repeals section 103L of such Act (50 U.S.C. 3034c), with clerical amendment to the table of contents, effective 90 days after enactment. (3) Foreign Malign Influence Center.—Directs the DNI to submit a termination plan to congressional intelligence committees within 90 days after enactment; begin termination at least 90 days after plan submission or one year after enactment (whichever later); and complete termination within 455 days after enactment, with staff reductions complying with section 403(b) requirements. Repeals section 119C of such Act (50 U.S.C. 3059) and makes conforming amendments, including new definitions of "covered foreign country" (i.e., China, Russia, North Korea, Iran, or others as designated by the DNI) and "foreign malign influence" (i.e., hostile efforts by such countries to influence U.S. policies or public opinion); effective 455 days after enactment. Permits retention of certain coordinating functions at the Office of the DNI.

This section establishes a prohibition on obligating or expending funds from the Intelligence Community Management Account (which funds the Office of the Director of National Intelligence) for analytic collaboration—including studies, research, or assessments—with (1) federally funded research and development centers receiving or expecting financial or in-kind support from non-Five Eyes foreign governments; (2) 501(c)(3) tax-exempt organizations or self-described think tanks receiving or expecting such support; or (3) entities organized for research or advocacy in public policy or political strategy receiving or expecting such support from the governments (or military/intelligence affiliates) of China, Russia, North Korea, Iran, Venezuela, or Cuba. It further subjects the National Intelligence Council's (NIC) authority to contract for substantive experts to this prohibition (previously subject only to the direction and control of the Director of National Intelligence). (The NIC produces national intelligence estimates and assists the Director in carrying out intelligence community responsibilities.)

This section requires the Director of National Intelligence to transfer the functions of the National Intelligence University to the National Defense University not later than 180 days after the date of enactment. The section (1) repeals subtitle D of title X of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3227 et seq.), which had directed such university's transfer from the Defense Intelligence Agency to the Director of National Intelligence upon specified certifications; (2) makes conforming amendments to 10 U.S.C. 2151(b), 17 U.S.C. 105(d)(2), and section 5324 of the Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020 (50 U.S.C. 3334a); (3) amends the table of contents for the National Security Act of 1947; and (4) specifies that the amendments take effect 180 days after enactment. (Thus, advanced intelligence education for Department of Defense and intelligence community personnel will be consolidated under the National Defense University, a Department of Defense institution for joint professional military education.)

This section establishes the Intelligence Community Technology Bridge Fund in the Treasury, to be administered by the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), consisting of appropriations and available until expended, to assist businesses or nonprofit organizations (i.e., 501(c)(3) tax-exempt entities) in transitioning products or services from research and development to prototype or production phases to advance intelligence community (IC) acquisitions. Amounts in the fund may be provided to IC elements as grants, payments for products or services, or equity payments, but only for entities under contract with an IC element for research and development where the DNI or an IC head attests to the product's utility for a mission need (e.g., addressing a capability gap or increasing supplier competition); priority goes to small business concerns and nontraditional defense contractors (i.e., entities not performing Department of Defense contracts or subcontracts subject to full cost accounting standards for the prior year). In administering the fund, the DNI must consult with IC heads and may consult with entities such as the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency and Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity. This section requires annual reports to the congressional intelligence committees, beginning September 30, 2026, on fund expenditures, obligations, effects, and IC transition activities; and authorizes appropriations of $75 million for fiscal year 2026 and each fiscal year thereafter, with a limitation that the fund balance not exceed $75 million at any time.

This section requires the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), not later than 90 days after enactment, to establish a policy directing existing and future intelligence community (IC) funding and resources to ensure sufficient cleared personnel—including private sector experts—to identify and respond to biotechnology threats (i.e., military, industrial, agricultural, and healthcare threats apart from biological weapons). The policy must include (1) the exact number of personnel dedicated to such biotechnology issues in each IC element as of the relevant date, with breakdowns by position function; and (2) an assessment of (A) appropriate additional full-time employees or detailees, (B) increased partnerships with government and private sector organizations—including National Laboratories (as defined in section 2 of the Energy Policy Act of 2005)—and use of IC funding for expertise and security clearances, (C) improved use of special hiring authorities, and (D) enhanced recruitment and retention of biotechnology talent. Not later than 180 days after establishing the policy, the DNI must direct specified IC funding and resources toward securing such expertise and submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on additional funding and resources needed.

This section directs the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), in consultation with other intelligence community elements, to support and consult with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), and other agencies in reviewing foreign acquisitions of covered entities (i.e., private entities involved in genomic data, sequencing, synthesis, or biobanks holding large amounts of genomic or biological data), including attempts by the People's Republic of China to acquire such data domestically or abroad via economic support to infrastructure in foreign countries of concern. It requires the DNI to brief the congressional intelligence committees, Senate Committees on Foreign Relations and Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, and House Committees on Foreign Affairs and Financial Services within 90 days of enactment on (1) a formal process for intelligence community support to agencies on adversary genomic data acquisitions, compliant with Executive Order 14117 (relating to preventing access to Americans' bulk sensitive personal data by countries of concern); and (2) any additional resources or authorities needed for subsequent assessments. It defines biological data (i.e., information from biological systems of humans, animals, plants, or microbes) and covered entity, and applies the definition of foreign entity of concern from 42 U.S.C. 19221(a).

This section directs the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), within 90 days of enactment and in consultation with other intelligence community (IC) heads, to establish a policy prohibiting IC elements from contracting with Chinese biotechnology suppliers (i.e., those organized under or subject to the jurisdiction of the People's Republic of China) that the DNI determines pose a security threat. The policy further requires that IC procurements of any product made using synthetic DNA or RNA (i.e., nucleic acids produced de novo through chemical or enzymatic synthesis) meet three criteria: (1) final assembly or processing occurs in the United States; (2) all significant processing occurs in the United States; and (3) all or nearly all ingredients or components are made and sourced in the United States. The DNI may waive the policy if a prohibited purchase fulfills a national security need.

This section directs the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the Secretaries of Defense and Energy, to identify by 240 days after enactment one or more intelligence community sites suitable for deployment of advanced nuclear technologies (1-100 megawatts minimum) to provide secure, resilient energy for facilities under intelligence community financial or maintenance responsibility. For each selected site, it requires the responsible intelligence community element head—in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence, Secretary of Energy, and relevant agency heads—to prioritize early site preparation and licensing activities with a goal of beginning deployment within three years after enactment; authorizes interconnection with the commercial electric grid if it enhances national security; and requires that fuel for such technologies is not subject to obligations (as defined in 10 C.F.R. § 110.2 or successor regulations).

This section directs the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with specified intelligence officials from the CIA, DIA, Treasury, DOE, State, and other elements, to submit to the President and congressional intelligence committees, not later than 90 days after enactment, a strategy for addressing intelligence gaps relating to (1) investment activity by China in the U.S. biotechnology sector, (2) acquisition of U.S.-origin biotechnology intellectual property by Chinese entities, and (3) authorities or resources needed to address such gaps. Concurrently, it requires the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, to submit to the President a recommendation on whether to expand outbound investment screening regulations at 31 C.F.R. pt. 850 to cover biotechnology.

This section requires the Artificial Intelligence Security Center to make available a subsidized research test bed to private sector and academic researchers for artificial intelligence security research, including secure access in a controlled environment to proprietary third-party models with vendor consent. The section further establishes test bed requirements, including (1) terms of usage limiting researcher publications only to protect classified or proprietary information and making the test bed available to other federal agencies on a cost-recovery basis; and (2) coordination with the Secretary of Energy to leverage infrastructure and resources of the National Artificial Intelligence Research Resource; and directs the Center to establish mechanisms, such as contractual incentives, to facilitate voluntary vendor provision of proprietary models and associated resources to qualified independent third-party researchers.

This section directs the Intelligence Community (IC) to identify and promote reuse and sharing of commonly used artificial intelligence (AI) systems and functions across IC elements. Specifically, within one year of enactment, the IC Chief Information Officer (CIO), in coordination with the Chief AI Officer, must identify such systems or functions with the greatest reuse potential; and each IC element's Chief AI Officer must adopt a policy promoting sharing of custom-developed code—including models and weights—with other elements relying on common systems, except as prohibited by contract or to protect intelligence sources and methods. The section further requires IC elements, through contract terms, to (1) retain rights to Federal data and improvements for continued AI design, development, testing, and operation; (2) protect Federal information from vendor reuse in products or services sold to foreign governments; and (3) prohibit use of IC data to train or improve vendor commercial offerings without head approval. It also directs the IC CIO to provide model contract terms to prevent vendor lock-in, encourage competition, and prioritize interoperable AI products and services. Additionally, this section requires each IC element head to track and evaluate procured and developed AI performance through (1) documenting capabilities, limitations, and usage guidelines; (2) documenting data provenance; (3) ongoing testing and validation, including real-world conditions; (4) assessing for overfitting; (5) prioritizing continuous improvement via contracts; (6) stipulating retraining or decommissioning conditions; and (7) post-award monitoring.

This section defines "use case," with respect to an artificial intelligence (AI) system, as the specific mission performed through the system's use. It requires the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), not later than 30 days after enactment, to issue guidance to intelligence community (IC) element heads ensuring consistent interpretation of high-impact AI systems and use cases. It further requires each IC element head to maintain an annual inventory of high-impact AI use cases—including details on associated AI systems—and submit it annually to the congressional intelligence committees. Finally, it directs the DNI, in coordination with IC element heads, to issue guidance ensuring minimum standards for IC elements using high-impact AI systems or use cases, specifically covering: (1) whistleblower protections; (2) risk management practices and policies; (3) performance expectations—including continuous monitoring, independent testing, and cost analyses relative to human-led alternatives—to ensure ongoing performance or discontinuation; (4) pre-deployment documentation of advantages and risks (with safeguards), operating costs, reevaluation schedules, and oversight mechanisms; and (5) policies for human oversight and training.

This section amends intelligence community artificial intelligence policies under Section 6702 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (50 U.S.C. 3334m) by (1) requiring such policies to apply, to the greatest extent possible, to publicly available artificial intelligence models when used for intelligence purposes (i.e., collection, analysis, or other mission-related intelligence activities) in classified environments; (2) directing the Chief Artificial Intelligence Officer of the Intelligence Community, or a designated provider, to establish common testing standards and benchmarks for artificial intelligence models across use cases (e.g., targeting, machine translation, object detection, recognition) with elevated standards for high-impact use cases potentially informing lethal applications; (3) requiring the Chief Artificial Intelligence Officer to convene the Intelligence Community Chief Artificial Intelligence Officer Council to identify classified computing environments for pre-acquisition testing and evaluation of models; (4) defining "intelligence purpose" and directing the Director of National Intelligence to issue guidance within 30 days of enactment ensuring consistent interpretation of high-impact artificial intelligence systems and use cases across intelligence community elements; and (5) requiring updates to Intelligence Community Directive 505 (on artificial intelligence) and related documents for compliance.

This section states the sense of Congress that an intelligence community (IC) element's evaluation of training data, data labeling methods, and model weights for AI systems under consideration does not constitute IC collection. It directs the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the Attorney General, to revise IC interim guidance entitled “Regarding the Acquisition and Use of Foundation Models” to stipulate that (1) IC elements evaluating foundation model (i.e., large pre-trained AI models) acquisition must consider training data sources and labeling methods—including third-party vendor roles—to inform mitigation, dissemination, usage, or retention decisions; and (2) IC elements must, to the greatest extent practicable, avoid publicly available models found to contain unlawfully obtained information.

This section directs the Director of National Intelligence, not later than 60 days after enactment, to develop a strategy for (1) coordinating the collection, processing, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence on critical and emerging technologies across the intelligence community and (2) appropriately sharing such intelligence with federal departments and agencies responsible for regulation, innovation and research, science, public health, export controls and screenings, and federal financial tools. Not later than 30 days after developing the strategy, the Director must submit it to the congressional intelligence committees.

This section establishes notification requirements under new section 806 of the National Security Act of 1947 for declassifications, downgradings, or directions thereof of intelligence sources, methods, or activities information. The Director of National Intelligence (or Principal Deputy) must notify the congressional intelligence committees and the Archivist of the United States in writing immediately upon such actions pursuant to section 3.1(c) of Executive Order 13526 (or successor), and agency heads (or senior officials) must do so for declassifications pursuant to section 3.1(d); each notification includes a copy of the information.

This section revises the "contributing factor" standard under the Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act of 2004 (50 U.S.C. 3341(j)(4)(C)) for determining whether a protected disclosure violated prohibitions on retaliatory adverse security clearance or access eligibility decisions. It (1) requires agencies to find a violation if the individual demonstrates the disclosure was a contributing factor; (2) permits such demonstration through circumstantial evidence (e.g., the deciding official's knowledge of the disclosure and timing suggesting a causal link); and (3) establishes an agency defense if it proves by clear and convincing evidence that the same adverse determination would have occurred absent the disclosure. (Thus, this aligns security clearance retaliation claims with standards in other federal whistleblower protection statutes.)

This section directs the Director of National Intelligence to review the feasibility of updating personnel security standards, procedures, and adjudicative guidelines to grant eligibility for access to sensitive compartmented information (SCI) and other controlled access program information to intelligence community personnel retired or separated for not more than five years who held such eligibility the day prior to separation, provided (1) no indication they no longer meet access standards, (2) they certify in writing no change in information from their last background investigation, and (3) a record check reveals no unfavorable information. The section further directs the Director to assess the feasibility and advisability of applying continuous vetting and due diligence to inactive security clearances and, not later than 120 days after enactment, to submit related findings to the congressional intelligence committees.

This section requires covered officials—including the Secretary of the Treasury, Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), heads of intelligence community elements, and other relevant agency heads—to ensure use of secure systems meeting classified information protection standards by September 30, 2028, for National Intelligence Program (NIP) budget formulation and submission (including justifications to Congress), fund apportionment and execution, and specified federal financial management functions (e.g., budget execution, payable management, financial reporting). It authorizes the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), in consultation with the Secretaries of Defense and the Treasury and the OMB Director, to waive these requirements if use of non-compliant systems poses no significant counterintelligence risk or if compliance would heighten threats to classified activities; it also permits covered officials to modify or omit classified expenditure details in public reports. This section further authorizes the DNI to reimburse covered officials for implementation costs using Intelligence Community Management Account funds available through September 30, 2028, and directs the DNI, Secretary of the Treasury, and intelligence community heads to submit a joint implementation cost estimate to the congressional intelligence committees within 180 days of enactment. This section amends sec. 7 of the Federal Funding Accountability and Transparency Act of 2006 (31 U.S.C. 6101 note) to exempt from public disclosure any information the DNI, in consultation with the OMB Director, determines would reveal classified programs or activities (including when combined with other public data).

This section requires the Director of National Intelligence to submit to the congressional intelligence committees, not later than 120 days after enactment and annually thereafter, a report on approvals of interim security clearances or other access to classified intelligence information for covered individuals (i.e., intelligence community employees or contractors, or individuals granted access to intelligence community facilities or information) that do not satisfy investigative and adjudicative standards under Executive Order 12968 (relating to access to classified information, as required by 50 U.S.C. §3161). The first report covers calendar years 2017 through the year of enactment. Each report includes (1) the number of such approvals, disaggregated by sponsoring agency, duration of access, and level of access (including special access programs or controlled access programs); (2) any investigative or adjudicative process conducted for each level; (3) categorizations of justifications supporting approvals and the number per category; and (4) dispositions of approvals, disaggregated by instances of termination, continuation, or completion of full standards-compliant processes.

This section revises the definition of "employee," for purposes of the provision authorizing Intelligence Community personnel to report complaints or information to the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community, to include a former employee or former contractor if the complaint or information arises from or relates to the period of service. (Thus, former personnel may submit whistleblower reports to the Inspector General regarding matters from their Intelligence Community tenure.)

This section expands whistleblower protections under section 1104 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3234) by prohibiting reprisal personnel actions against covered intelligence community employees or contractors for lawful disclosures to (1) the office of legislative affairs or congressional affairs of the employing agency (for communicating with Congress), in addition to existing protections for disclosures to the Director of National Intelligence or congressional intelligence committees, and (2) such offices of the employing or contracting agency in enforcement provisions. It makes a parallel expansion to protections against reprisals affecting security clearances or access determinations under section 3001(j) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (50 U.S.C. 3341). (Thus, intelligence community personnel may disclose covered information to agency legislative liaison offices without reprisal risk when intended for congressional communication.)

This section amends whistleblower protections for intelligence community (IC) employees and contractors under section 1104 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3234). (As background, this section prohibits reprisal personnel actions against IC personnel for lawful disclosures of wrongdoing, such as violations of law or abuse of authority.) (1) Adds "unauthorized whistleblower identity disclosure" (i.e., a knowing and willful revelation of identity or personally identifiable information identifying an individual as a whistleblower, with specified exceptions such as consent or reporting through authorized channels) to the list of prohibited personnel practices in subsection (a)(3)(J); and (2) revises enforcement provisions in subsection (f) to (a) require presidential enforcement consistent with 5 U.S.C. 2302(b)(8) (general whistleblower reprisal protections), and (b) authorize a private right of action in federal district court—after exhausting review by an inspector general and, if needed, an external review panel under section 1106—for all appropriate remedies, including injunctive relief and compensatory and punitive damages up to $250,000, consistent with 5 U.S.C. 1221 (Merit Systems Protection Board corrective actions for whistleblower reprisals). Such actions must be filed within 180 days of final administrative disposition. (Thus, victims of reprisal via identity disclosure gain direct access to federal court after administrative exhaustion.)

This section revises whistleblower procedures under 5 U.S.C. 416, 50 U.S.C. 3033(k)(5), and 50 U.S.C. 3517(d)(5) for intelligence community employees reporting urgent concerns (i.e., serious or flagrant problems, abuses, violations of law or executive order, false statements to Congress, or reprisals relating to classified intelligence activities) to congressional intelligence committees via Inspectors General. (1) It conditions Inspectors General's transmittal of complaints to agency heads or the Director of National Intelligence on a new direct-submission option; (2) it requires, upon employee request, Inspectors General to submit complaints or information directly to the committees without transmittal to the agency head or Director, within 7 calendar days of the Inspector General's determination that the complaint qualifies or of the request; and (3) it adds an alternative for employees to contact committees directly without providing prior notice to the agency head or Director, by obtaining and following secure-contact directions from the Inspector General within 7 calendar days of expressing that intent. (Thus, these changes expedite and expand bypass options around agency leadership for urgent concern submissions.)

This section adds a decision to order psychiatric testing or examination to the definition of personnel action under whistleblower protections applicable to employees (other than in certain excepted positions) and contractor employees of covered intelligence community elements (i.e., CIA, DIA, NGA, NSA, ODNI, NRO, excluding FBI). (Thus, such decisions by agency personnel are prohibited as reprisals for lawful disclosures of information to the DNI or designees, with the amendment applying to matters arising on or after enactment.)

This section requires the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), within 90 days of enactment and in coordination with appropriate intelligence community (IC) elements, to develop and issue standard guidelines for IC personnel to report and document anomalous health incidents (AHIs), ensuring such guidelines conform as practicable to Department of Defense (DoD) guidelines for DoD personnel. Within 10 days of issuance, the DNI must submit the guidelines to the congressional intelligence committees, along with a statement describing implementation, differences from DoD guidelines, and justifications for those differences.

This section directs the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), not later than 90 days after enactment, to initiate a review of intelligence community holdings regarding anomalous health incidents—including (1) reports of such incidents affecting U.S. government personnel and dependents, (2) reports of other incidents with similar symptoms and known causes affecting U.S. government personnel, (3) foreign governments' efforts to develop or deploy weapons or technology causing such symptoms, and (4) the intelligence community's success in detecting foreign clandestine weapons programs. Not later than 180 days after enactment, the DNI must conduct a declassification review of all such intelligence and publicly release a declassified report on the Office of the Director of National Intelligence website, with redactions limited to protecting sources and methods and information on U.S. persons.

This section directs the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), in coordination with appropriate federal agency heads and not later than 180 days after enactment, to (1) conduct a declassification review of intelligence on coronavirus research at the Wuhan Institute of Virology or other Chinese research centers—including gain-of-function research, funding sources (Chinese and foreign), and researcher names and current employment; (2) conduct a declassification review of intelligence on efforts by Chinese government officials or entities to disrupt COVID-19 origins investigations and information sharing (e.g., limiting data on SARS-CoV-2 transmissibility with the United States, allies, the United Nations, and World Health Organization; obstructing internal Chinese sharing; pressuring foreign entities; disrupting vaccine R&D; and promoting alternative narratives); (3) publicly release a declassified report containing appropriate information from both reviews, with redactions only as needed to protect sources, methods, and U.S. persons' information; and (4) submit an unredacted version of the report to the congressional intelligence committees.

This section requires the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, to conduct counterintelligence briefings for members of the Armed Forces as part of the pre-separation certification process required by 10 USC 989(c). (As background, 10 USC 989 generally prohibits covered individuals—members of the Armed Forces in certain sensitive positions—from post-service employment with governments or companies of concern, such as the People's Republic of China or covered foreign entities [i.e., those owned or controlled by such governments].) The briefings must cover (1) methods commonly used by such governments and companies to solicit sensitive military techniques, tactics, and procedures from covered individuals; (2) recommended practices to avoid prohibited activities subject to civil or criminal penalties; (3) contact information for counterintelligence authorities to report recruitment attempts or suspicious contacts; and (4) an overview of the prohibition and penalties under 10 USC 989(a) and (c). The Under Secretary may provide these briefings during trainings required by Department of Defense Directive 5240.06 (relating to counterintelligence awareness and reporting), or successor document.

This section directs the Secretary of State, notwithstanding the Joint Resolution of August 4, 1947 (22 U.S.C. 287 note), to deny visas to nationals of covered nations—China, the Russian Federation, Iran, North Korea, and Cuba—for accreditation to a United Nations mission or other multilateral international organization in the United States if the Secretary determines, in consultation with the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Director of National Intelligence, that the national has engaged in known or suspected intelligence or espionage activities (including precursors to espionage) against the United States or its allies or partners, or is a known or suspected intelligence officer.

This section revises Section 601 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1985 by (1) changing "It is the sense of the Congress" to "It is the policy of the United States" in subsection (a); (2) redesignating subsections (b) through (d) as subsections (d) through (f); and (3) inserting new subsections (b) and (c). New subsection (b) requires the Secretary of State, when negotiating agreements with foreign governments on reciprocal privileges and immunities for U.S. diplomatic personnel, to consult with the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Director of National Intelligence to achieve the policy in subsection (a). New subsection (c) requires those three officials to submit a report, not later than 90 days after enactment and annually thereafter for five years, to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate Committee on Appropriations, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, and House Committee on Appropriations identifying each foreign government that (1) engages in intelligence activities within the United States harmful to U.S. national security and (2) possesses numbers, status, privileges and immunities, travel accommodations, and facilities in the United States exceeding those afforded to U.S. official representatives in that country.

This section establishes limits on diplomatic privileges and immunities for accredited diplomatic and consular personnel of covered nations (i.e., China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and Cuba) in the United States. Such personnel may not (1) receive such privileges and immunities for more than three consecutive years; (2) receive them for a second three-year period until after living outside the United States for not less than two years; or (3) receive them for more than six total years.

This section expands the strict enforcement of travel protocols and procedures under Section 502 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 from consular personnel of the Russian Federation to accredited diplomatic and consular personnel of covered nations (China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and Cuba). It requires the Secretary of State, in establishing advance approval requirements, to (1) mandate requests at least two business days before travel, (2) immediately share requests with the Director of National Intelligence and Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, (3) certify to specified congressional committees within 10 days of approval that personnel are not known or suspected intelligence officers and travel will not serve intelligence purposes, and (4) establish penalties for noncompliance including loss of diplomatic privileges and immunities. The section also modifies quarterly reporting requirements to cover the number of requests submitted and approved (previously, only notifications submitted), limiting such reports to five years after enactment of these new requirements.

This section establishes in 18 U.S.C. chapter 213 a new section (§3302) eliminating the statute of limitations for indictments or informations on (1) any violation or conspiracy under §951 (agents of foreign governments), (2) any violation or conspiracy under §794 (gathering or delivering defense information to aid a foreign government), or (3) any violation of §1425 (procuring citizenship or naturalization unlawfully) to facilitate a §951 violation. It further amends a note to §792 (harboring or concealing persons) to remove §794 from the list of offenses subject to no limitations period (i.e., striking ", 793, or 794" and inserting "or 793"). It also makes a clerical amendment to the chapter table of sections.

This section amends spectrum reallocation requirements under the National Telecommunications and Information Administration Organization Act (1) to revise classification rules for federal transition plans by permitting full classification of the entire plan if even a redacted version cannot be publicly released, as determined by the federal entity head, with required notification to NTIA; and (2) to designate each element of the intelligence community as a federal entity eligible for Spectrum Relocation Fund payments to cover auction-related relocation or sharing costs, regardless of holding a government station license. (The Spectrum Relocation Fund reimburses federal spectrum users for costs incurred when bands are reallocated for commercial use via FCC auction.)

This section establishes under new 42 U.S.C. 4336(c) a presidential waiver authority exempting covered intelligence community elements (i.e., Central Intelligence Agency through Defense Intelligence Agency, as specified in 50 U.S.C. 3003(4)(A)-(K)) from preparing a National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) environmental document (i.e., environmental assessment or environmental impact statement) for a proposed agency action if the President determines the waiver is necessary to protect the United States from a direct national security threat identified by the intelligence community and the action advances foreign intelligence collection or supports a covert action previously notified to Congress under 50 U.S.C. 3093. (Prior to issuing the waiver, the President must notify the congressional intelligence committees of the element involved, the proposed action, its purpose, and a justification that NEPA review would unduly affect national security.) This section also amends 42 U.S.C. 4336(a) to add this presidential waiver as a fifth threshold determination (new paragraph (5)) under which agencies are not required to prepare an environmental document.

This section repeals or modifies multiple statutory reporting and briefing requirements related to intelligence community activities, as follows: (1) eliminates briefings on analytic integrity reviews under section 1019 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 by striking subsections (c) and (d), with a conforming amendment to require annual reports by February 1; (2) repeals personnel-level assessments for the intelligence community under section 506B of the National Security Act of 1947; (3) eliminates reports on foreign efforts to illicitly acquire satellites and related items under section 1261 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013; (4) repeals reporting on the National Intelligence University plan under section 1033 of the National Security Act of 1947; (5) repeals requirements to monitor mineral investments under China's Belt and Road Initiative under section 7003 of the Energy Act of 2020; (6) repeals notices of deployment or transfer of containerized missile systems by Russia or certain other countries under section 501 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016; (7) eliminates annual reports and semiannual briefings on the intelligence community's program to support sanctions against foreign opioid traffickers under section 7231 of the Fentanyl Sanctions Act (21 U.S.C. 2331); (8) eliminates briefings on programs for next-generation microelectronics in support of artificial intelligence under section 7507 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024; (9) repeals reports on commerce with and assistance to Cuba from other foreign countries under section 108 of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996; (10) eliminates annual briefings on Iranian expenditures supporting foreign military and terrorist activities under section 6705 of the Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020; and (11) repeals reports on best practices to protect the privacy, civil liberties, and civil rights of Chinese Americans under section 1110 of the National Security Act of 1947. Each repeal includes related clerical amendments to tables of contents.

This section expands the real estate transactions subject to review by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS)—which assesses foreign investments for national security risks—to include private or public property in close proximity to facilities owned or operated by an element of the intelligence community, in addition to U.S. military installations (with conforming changes to related exceptions). The amendments apply to transactions proposed or pending on or after the date of enactment.

This section requires the Election Assistance Commission (EAC) to provide for penetration testing (i.e., simulated cyberattacks to identify vulnerabilities) as part of the testing, certification, decertification, and recertification of voting system hardware and software by accredited laboratories, not later than 180 days after enactment. The EAC must develop a program for accepting penetration testing results on election systems—which is required for EAC certification—vote on selecting competent entities to conduct the testing, and may consult the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) or other federal agencies on selection criteria and program aspects.

This section establishes a five-year Independent Security Testing and Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure Pilot Program for Election Systems (VDP-E), to be administered by the Election Assistance Commission (EAC) in consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security. The program requires (1) a mechanism for election system vendors to voluntarily make voting machines and source code available to vetted cybersecurity researchers; (2) researcher terms mandating confidential notification of vulnerabilities to vendors, EAC, and the Secretary for 180 days; (3) vendor obligations to patch critical or high vulnerabilities (as defined by NIST) within 180 days and notify state and local officials, EAC, and the Secretary; (4) expedited EAC review (90 days) of patches for certified systems, with automatic certification if not completed; and (5) notification to CISA within 180 days for inclusion in the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures database. Participation is voluntary, with safe harbor protections deeming good-faith research authorized under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (18 U.S.C. 1030) and exempt from the Digital Millennium Copyright Act anti-circumvention prohibition (17 U.S.C. 1201(a)(1)(A)), without limiting existing exemptions under that section.

This section directs the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), in coordination with other relevant federal agencies and entities holding the records, to prepare for and expedite the declassification in 2026 of Church Committee archival files required for public release under Senate Resolution 474 (96th Congress, agreed to December 1, 1980). (The Church Committee, formally the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, investigated intelligence abuses by intelligence community agencies in the 1970s; the resolution requires public availability of certain records after 50 years, following archival processing and declassification.)

This section authorizes the Secretary of Energy, acting through the Director of the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, to enter into contracts or other arrangements for goods and services through Department of Energy National Laboratories, plants, or sites for foreign material acquisition in support of national security requirements. It requires the Director to submit annual reports on the use of this authority to the congressional intelligence committees, beginning not later than one year after enactment and continuing until four years after enactment.

This section revises restrictions under the Atomic Energy Defense Act on admitting citizens or agents of covered foreign nations (i.e., specified adversaries such as China) or nations on the current sensitive countries list to non-public areas of certain Department of Energy (DOE) facilities (i.e., those supporting DOE missions located at national laboratories, national security laboratories, nuclear weapons production facilities, or specified sites). Specifically, it— (1) requires background reviews by the Secretary of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Administrator, or DOE Director of Intelligence and Counterintelligence prior to such admittance—with reviews for covered foreign nations applying to all such facilities and reviews for sensitive countries applying only to national security laboratories, nuclear weapons production facilities, and specified sites (previously, reviews only by Secretary or Administrator for covered foreign nations at prior facilities); (2) extends the prohibition on admittance without waiver (and waiver authority) to the Director; (3) expands covered facilities to expressly include all national laboratories (previously, only national security laboratories, which are the weapons labs at Los Alamos, Lawrence Livermore, and Sandia); and (4) replaces references to NNSA with DOE.