S. 4227 — Preventing Illegal Laboratories and Protecting Public Health Act of 2026

This section establishes a program requiring covered distributors of highly pathogenic agents to maintain electronic logbooks recording sales, leases, loans, and other transfers, including specified details such as the agent's name, purchaser's identifying information and intended use, date and method of transfer, and purchaser's signature. The Secretary must develop an initial list of such agents within six months of enactment, review and update it annually after consulting relevant agencies (e.g., CDC, NIH, DHS) and considering specified biosafety guidelines, and include in each logbook a notice of criminal penalties under 18 U.S.C. 1001 (i.e., fines, up to five years' imprisonment, or up to eight years for specified offenses) for false statements. Logbook entries must be retained for at least three years (with successor entities assuming responsibility), disclosures are restricted to specified purposes and recipients with a FOIA exemption, intra-university laboratory transfers are exempt, and the Secretary may conduct risk-based audits for suspected violations.

This section directs the National Security Advisor, in consultation with specified federal officials, to identify a single federal entity to oversee periodic strategic evaluations of high-containment laboratories (i.e., those suitable for biosafety level 3 or higher procedures, as defined in the latest edition of *Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories* published by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and National Institutes of Health). The evaluations must assess (1) the number, location, and mission of such laboratories; (2) their capacity to meet national biosafety and biosecurity goals; (3) physical security measures; (4) aggregate risks from existing and expanded laboratories; and (5) needed oversight. They must also develop national standards for laboratory design, construction, commissioning, operation, and maintenance, in consultation with the scientific community. The designated entity must submit evaluation reports to the President and Congress with recommendations on addressing federal oversight gaps and utilizing laboratories for public health, biosafety, and biosecurity. It must establish, within one year, the Public Health Biosafety and Biosecurity Team as a single federal point of contact for state, local, Tribal, and territorial agencies on high-containment laboratory oversight, public health impacts, and related intergovernmental coordination. (Thus, the team centralizes federal assistance previously dispersed across agencies.) The entity must also conduct a feasibility study on a database of high-containment laboratories—covering ownership, location, licensing status, violations, disciplinary actions, and other biosafety/biosecurity information—and report study results to Congress.